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UPROOTING THE CELL PLANT: 





APPROACHES TO SURREPTITIOUS 







In their effort to solve crimes, law enforcement agencies em­
ploy various interrogation techniques to acquire incriminating evi­
dence. Both Canada and the United States afford an accused 
certain rights under their respective constitutions that are intended 
to protect him from the overreaching power of the state during such 
interrogations. These protections include the right to silence and 
the right to counsel. 1 When an accused invokes these rights and 
refuses to provide any statements, some police officers engage in 
surreptitious forms of questioning that subvert the accused's choice 
not to speak to the authorities. Enter the cell-plant interrogator. 
Cell-plant interrogations involve questioning by an undercover 
agent who elicits incriminating statements from an accused who is 
unaware that he is speaking with a state agent.2 These surreptitious 
interrogations take place within jailhouses, prisons, or other deten­
>I< Doctor of Civil Law Candidate and O'Brien Fellow at the McGill Centre for 
Human Rights and Legal Pluralism, Faculty of Law, McGill University; LLM (McGill 
University, 2008); JD (New England School of Law, 2004). This Article is revised from 
my LLM thesis submitted to McGill University in 2008. I wish to acknowledge the 
suggestions I received with respect to this Article from Professor David Siegel, Laura 
Otenti, Esq., Alexandra Harrington, Esq., and Romain Rard. I also wish to express my 
thanks to Professor Ronald Sklar, who supervised the writing of the LLM thesis upon 
which this Article was based. All errors are mine. 
1. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI; Charter of Rights and Freedoms §§ 7, 10, Part 
I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 
(U.K.). 
2. Undercover police officers or jailhouse informants are most often used as state 
agents in the context of cell-plant interrogations. In some cases, police officers per­
suade friends or family of the accused to assist in procuring incriminating statements. 
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tion environments.3 Such deceptive techniques raise issues of fun­
damental fairness for two key reasons. First, cell-plant 
interrogations deprive an accused of the ability to make an in­
formed choice about whether to voluntarily or knowingly provide 
incriminating statements to the state and thus circumvent his right 
to remain silent or to have counsel present during an interrogation. 
Second, detention environments produce numerous anxieties in an 
accused, which an undercover agent may unfairly exploit to the 
state's advantage.4 Undoubtedly, almost all custodial environments 
contain coercive elements that disadvantage an accused. However, 
during a standard non-surreptitious custodial interrogation, an ac­
cused is advised of his constitutional rights and is afforded the right 
to have legal counsel present as a buffer between himself and the 
state. This prophylaxis is absent in cell-plant interrogations. 
Confronted with the possibility of admitting incriminating 
statements procured through such deceptive means, courts in Ca­
nada and the United States have placed certain restrictions on their 
admissibility. These restrictions are rooted in the implied right to 
silence embedded within s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms and the right to counsel granted by the Sixth Amend­
ment to the United States Constitution.5 Fundamentally, the Su­
preme Courts of Canada and the United States have each held that, 
in the context of cell-plant interrogations, where a state agent has 
elicited incriminating statements from an accused, the statements 
may be excluded from evidence.6 The Supreme Court of Canada 
has determined that a cell-plant interrogation conducted in a man­
ner that infringes upon an accused's right to silence deprives the 
accused of the choice to speak to authorities.1 The Supreme Court 
of the United States has affirmed that an accused has a right to 
counsel during "the most critical period of the proceedings," when 
3. Although the term "cell plant" may suggest that cell-plant interrogations only 
take place in the accused's detention cell, these interrogations may occur anywhere in 
the detention environment. Nonetheless, the traditional jail cell, given its closed 
quarters and relative privacy, is the most likely location where these interrogations take 
place. 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 18-28. 
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms §§ 7, 10. 
6. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 
264 (1980); R. v. Broyles, [1991] 3 S.c.R. 595 (Can. 1991), available at 1991 Carswell 
Alta 212 (Westlaw); R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.c.R. 151 (Can. 1990), available at 1990 
CarswellYukon 7 (Westlaw). 
7. Heben, 1990 Carswell Yukon 7, 'lI 138. 
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consultation, thorough investigation, and preparation are vitally 
important.8 
While Australian9 and British courts,1O in addition to the Euro­
pean Court of Human Rights,ll have similarly confronted issues re­
lated to cell-plant interrogations, courts in Canada and the United 
States have produced the largest and most extensive volume of ju­
risprudence on these issues to date.12 Therefore, for the purposes 
of achieving greater depth of analysis, this Article will focus on and 
compare the case law from these two countries. Despite the ex­
tremely similar language used by Canadian and American courts in 
their legal tests, particularly the terms "state agent" and "elicita­
tion," these terms have been interpreted in radically different 
waysP Furthermore, the scope of s. 7 and the Sixth Amendment 
protections are remarkably dissimilar in certain respects. Conse­
quently, as this Article shall demonstrate, while factual circum­
stances in the United States may lead to the exclusion of evidence 
through the application of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 
Clause, the same factual circumstances may not lead to the same 
outcome under Canada's s. 7 right-to-silence protection. 
Identifying similarities and distinctions in the criminal proce­
dures of different jurisdictions can highlight the flaws and benefits 
of the methods that have developed in each country.l4 Such studies 
permit jurists and scholars to assess the positive and negative as­
pects of applying various legal approaches to particular issues.1s 
Thus, courts in Canada and the United States can learn much from 
the strengths and weaknesses of the other's approach to cell-plant 
interrogations and consequently provide greater protections (or 
8. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932) (noting that "the most critical period 
of the proceeding" for the particular defendants was "the time of their arraignment 
until the beginning of their trial"). For a discussion of when this critical period begins, 
see infra text accompanying notes 71-73. 
9. R. v. Swaffield, (1998) 192 C.L.R. 159 (Austl.), available at 1998 WL 1674165. 
10. Allan v. The Queen, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 2236, [1]-[143] (Eng.), available at 
2004 WL 1808797. 
11. Allan v. United Kingdom, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 12 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2003), availa­
ble at 2002 WL 31476273. 
12. Although Australian courts appear to be producing further jurisprudence on 
this matter, it is still relatively small in comparison to their North American counter­
parts. See, e.g., Muehleman v. Florida, 484 U.S. 882 (1987); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 
U.S. 436 (1986); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 
U.S. 264 (1980). 
13. See discussion infra Parts III, IV. 
14. Erik Luna, A Place for Comparative Criminal Procedure, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 
277,284 (2003-04). 
15. [d. 
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lesser protections as the case may be) to criminal defendants under 
their respective federal constitutional provisions.16 This Article will 
set out how legal tests in both jurisdictions should be reformulated 
accordingly. 
Part I will briefly canvass some of the concerns related to the 
acquisition of incriminating statements in the detention context and 
explain why these concerns should be given greater weight in the 
legal tests concerning admissibility of cell-plant statements. Part II 
will examine and compare the temporal, spatial, and subject matter 
scopes of protections in s. 7 and the Sixth Amendment by compar­
ing when and where the respective legal protections are operative 
and by looking at which crimes the rights apply to during an inter­
rogation. Parts III and IV respectively, compare and analyze the 
jurisdictions' different interpretations of the state agency and elici­
tation tests by examining the relevant jurisprudence and discussing 
the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. Ultimately, this 
Article concludes that the current legal tests in each country should 
be reformulated to incorporate the most protective aspects of each 
system. Specifically, the legal tests should be reconstructed to in­
corporate the definition of state agency rooted in Canadian juris­
prudence, while the definition of elicitation should be based on an 
interpretation found in United States case law. 
1. DETENTION ENVIRONMENTS 
Jailhouses and prisons have their own unique pressures, sub­
cultures, and social normsP Professor George Dix has noted that 
an accused's "confinement is likely to bring into play subtle influ­
ences that will make [him] particularly susceptible to undercover 
investigators' ploYS."18 He asserted that "[m]ere confinement 
might increase a subject's anxiety, and he is likely to seek discourse 
with others to relieve this anxiety. That search [for a discourse], of 
course, makes him more susceptible to an undercover investigator 
16. Conversely, courts in one jurisdiction may also adopt a more restrictive view 
of constitutional rights that is prevalent elsewhere and affords police agencies greater 
leeway in engaging in cell-plant interrogations. 
17. See RICHARD S. )ONES & THOMAS J. SCHMID, DOING TIME: PRISON EXPERI­
ENCE AND IDENTITY AMONG FIRST-TIME INMATES 1-4 (2000) ("Prisoners are thus as­
similated into an inmate society which places considerable importance on antisocial 
attitudes and behavior; within this society, prisoners show solidarity and gain status by 
adhering to the 'inmate code_' "). However, not all detention environments are the 
same. For a discussion of jailhouse environments, see infra note 20. 
18. George E. Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 TEX. L. 
REV_ 203, 230 (1975)_ 
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seeking information about the offense for which the subject has 
been arrested."19 Within the context of jailhouse confinement spe­
cifically, the four areas likely to decrease a sense of anxiety are, 
"withstanding entry shock, maintaining outside links, securing sta­
bility in a situation of seeming chaos, and finding activities to fill 
otherwise empty time. "20 
If confinement itself increases an accused's anxiety, violence 
within detention contexts is very likely to augment this angst signifi­
cantly.21 Hans Toch argues that "[c]aricatures of maleness are con­
sensually touted, and (sometimes fraudulently) advertised. 
Credible or even incredible achievements in physical combat and 
sexual conquest are rewarded with status, esteem, and collective ad­
miration."22 He has noted furthermore that "prisons offer a quality 
of life redolent with restrictions, frustrations, and affronts to self­
esteem. "23 In light of the many affronts to dignity and status in the 
detention context, "[ s ]tatus calls for demonstrations of bravery or 
fearlessness, toughness, physical prowess, and loyalty to one's 
kind. "24 Justice Thurgood Marshall observed that "where the sus­
pect is incarcerated, the constant threat of physical danger peculiar 
to the prison environment may make him demonstrate his tough­
ness to other inmates by recounting or inventing past violent 
acts."25 
Also adding to the state's advantage over an accused in the 
context of cell-plant interrogations is the fact that law enforcement 
19. [d. 
20. John M. Klofas, The Jail and the Community, in INCARCERATING CRIMINALS: 
PRISONS AND JAILS IN SOCIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT 244,246 (Timothy J. 
Flanagan et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter INCARCERATING CRIMINALS]. While individuals 
. are incarcerated in both prisons and jails, the former are primarily used to house con­
victed felons. Jails, conversely, are populated by persons "awaiting trial for serious and 
nonserious offenses, persons serving time for misdemeanors, persons awaiting transfer 
to state prison systems, mental health facilities, and other settings." See INCARCERAT­
ING CRIMINALS, supra, at 220. The context of jailhouse confinement is particularly rele­
vant in the case of cell-plant interrogations. Police are often seeking incriminating 
information about individuals who are being detained pending trial and thus they will 
be housed in jails more than in any other detention contexts. Most of the cases dis­
cussed in this article involved cell-plant interrogation that took place in jail. 
21. See Hans Toch, Hypermasculinity and Prison Violence, in MASCULINITIES 
AND VIOLENCE (Lee H. Bowker ed., 1998); see also JAMES McGRATH MORRIS, JAIL­
HOUSE JOURNALISM: THE FOURTH ESTATE BEHIND BARS 9 (Transaction Publishers 
2002) (1998). 
22. Toch, supra note 21, at 171. 
23. [d. 
24. [d. at 172. 
25. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 307 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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agents can control the suspect's ability to select people with whom 
he can confide.26 Professor Welsh S. White posits that "the police 
can insure that if the pressures of confinement lead the suspect to 
confide in anyone, it will be a police agent."27 Given the state's 
power to control an accused's "channels of communication, it is bla­
tantly unfair to allow the government to exploit the suspect's vul­
nerability by trickery of this type. "28 Incarcerated individuals thus 
have to bear not only the inherent stress that arises from being in­
vestigated and interrogated, but also need to manage the anxieties 
that arise from incarceration itself. These pressures and anxieties 
should be taken into account when considering the admissibility of 
statements procured through cell-plant interrogations. With these 
considerations in mind, the following sections will begin to trace the 
different dimensions of the constitutional rights at play with an 
overview of the historical context of these rights. 
II. THE SCOPE OF SECTION SEVEN AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
A. Historical and Constitutional Context 
Canada and the United States have similar systems of govern­
ance with powers constitutionally distributed among the executive; 
legislative, and judicial branches of government.29 In the United 
States, powers are apportioned between the federal government 
and its constituent states,3° while in Canada the division of powers 
between the federal government and the provinces and territories is 
also constitutionally established.31 The Canadian and United States 
constitutions not only outline the separation of powers, but also 
contain fundamental protections that limit the actions of govern­
ment officials against individuals.32 These constitutional rights are 
particularly important in the criminal context and include the acqui­
26. See Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. 
REV. 581, 605 (1979) [hereinafter White, Police Trickery]. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. See U.S. CONST. arts. I-III; Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Viet., ch. 3 (U.K.), 
as reprinted in RS.C., No.5 (Appendix 1985). 
30. U.S. CONST. amend X. The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not dele­
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id. 
31. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Viet., eh. 3 (U.K.) §§ 91, 92, as reprinted in 
RS.C., No.5 (Appendix 1985). 
32. See generally U.S. CONST.; Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Viet., eh. 3 (U.K.), 
as reprinted in RS.C., No.5 (Appendix 1985). 
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sition of inculpatory statements from an accused by law enforce­
ment officers. 
The United States Bill of Rights was enacted in 1791 and con­
tains an array of individual rights limiting the power of the federal 
government.33 The Bill of Rights did not, however, affect the con­
duct of authorities in individual states or the ways in which such 
government actors procured incriminating statements until the 
twentieth century.34 During the nineteenth century, United States 
courts started to apply the common law confession rule, which 
originated under British jurisprudence, to determine whether in­
criminating statements made by an accused to persons in authority 
should be excluded if the statements were made involuntarily.35 
Courts examined the reliability of the statements and whether they 
were procured free from threats or inducements, but did not focus 
on whether the methods used were unfair.36 
During the late nineteenth century, the United States common 
law confession rule acquired a constitutional dimension.37 This was 
later merged with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1936.38 The United States Supreme Court's appli­
cation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause gradu­
33. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X. 
34. See {nfra text accompanying notes 42-44. 
35. British authorities first developed the common law confession rule in the 
eighteenth century. See The King v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 234-35 (K.B. 
1783). American authorities began applying the rule in the nineteenth century. See 
Commonwealth v. Chabbock, 1 Mass. (I Will.) 144 (1804), overruled in part by Com­
monwealth v. Carr, 373 Mass. 617 (1977). The United States Supreme Court decided its 
first case applying the common law confessions rule in Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 
(1884), abrogated on other grounds by Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912). For 
an overview of the development of the common law confession rule in the United 
States, see Richard A. Leo et aI., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and 
Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REv. 479, 488-90. 
36. This began to change during the mid-twentieth century. See discussion infra 
note 40. 
37. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897), abrogated by Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991). In Bram, the Court stated: 
In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question arises 
whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is con­
trolled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, commanding that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself." 
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V). 
38. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (use of confession as basis 
of conviction violated defendant's Fourteenth Amendment rights). The Fourteenth 
Amendment reads: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
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ally shifted from focusing on whether evidence was reliably 
obtained to examining whether the methods used to obtain the evi­
dence were fundamentally fair. 39 Still, in order for the courts to 
determine that due process was violated, the police methods em­
ployed needed to be sufficiently egregious to warrant their exclu­
sion.40 Confessions obtained through police methods that fell short 
of being considered highly offensive would still be admitted, and, 
thus, the Court's due process jurisprudence failed to substantially 
curb overreaching state conduct.41 
During the mid-twentieth century, the United States Supreme 
Court began to apply certain portions of the Bill of Rights to the 
actions of state authorities by virtue of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment.42 This selective incorporation process applied the Fifth 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
39. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952), overruled in part by Mapp 
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
40. See id. In Rochin, police ordered a doctor to extract two capsules from the 
defendant's stomach. Id. at 166. Doctors forcibly inserted a tube into Rochin's stom­
ach and released a substance that induced Rochin to throw up two morphine capsules. 
Id. The Court likened this method to obtaining a confession from a defendant by the 
use of physical abuse, and held that even where inculpatory statements were indepen­
dently established as true, "coerced confessions offend[ed] the community's sense of 
fair play and decency." Id. at 167, 173. 
41. See, e.g., Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958), abrogated by Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Crooker, the majority held that due process was not 
violated and admitted a confession into evidence even though police continued to inter­
rogate Crooker despite his request to see his lawyer. Id. at 434. But see Spano v. New 
York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). In Spano, the Court determined that Spano's due process 
rights were violated when, after being formally charged for murder, the prosecutor and 
several police officers, one of whom was an old childhood friend, interrogated Spano 
for roughly eight hours despite Spano's persistent requests to speak with his lawyer. 
The Court held that Spano's "will was overborne by official pressure, fatigue and sym­
pathy falsely aroused, after considering all the facts in their post-indictment setting." 
Id. at 323. 
For further commentary on the application of the due process test to confessions, 
see Welsh S. White, Interrogation Without Questions: Rhode Island v. Innis and United 
States v. Henry, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1209, 1209-11 (1980) [hereinafter White, Interroga­
tion Without Questions]; White, Police Trickery, supra note 26, at 593-96. Professor 
Yale Kamisar has also noted that the safeguards provided by the Court's totality of the 
circumstances test were largely illUSOry. Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda 
Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" 
Test, 65 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1996), reprinted in POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFES­
SIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 41, 43 (1980). 
42. The applicable portion of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "[N]or shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...." 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. During the middle of the twentieth century, the Court, 
through its doctrine of selective incorporation, made certain provisions of the Bill of 
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Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause and the Sixth Amend­
ment's Right-to-Counsel provision to confessions obtained by im­
proper state action.43 When courts determine that police have used 
methods to obtain evidence in violation of the accused's constitu­
tional rights, the evidence may be excluded.44 
Canada's juridical experience with constitutional protections 
has been considerably shorter than that of the United States. Ca­
nada became a largely self-governing state with the passage of the 
British North America Act in 1867. This Act, however, did not in­
clude a body of codified individual legal rights akin to those found 
in the United States Bill of Rights.45 Since 1867, the common law 
confession rule46 and other statutory protections, such as those in­
cluded in the Canadian Bill of Rights,47 have provided Canadian 
defendants with the sort of protections guaranteed by the United 
States Bill of Rights.48 These legal norms, however, failed to suffi­
ciently protect the rights of individual citizens against overreaching 
Rights applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Through this doc­
trine, the Supreme Court and other courts began to apply the important protections 
found in the Bill of Rights to both federal and state criminal cases. See, e.g., Gideon v. 
Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963). 
43. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,7-8 (1964) (self-incrimination); Gideon, 372 
U.S. at 340-45 (right to counsel). 
44. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-401, 406 n.12 (1977) (stating 
that defendant's self-incriminating statements, acquired in the absence of counsel, could 
not constitutionally be admitted into evidence). Appellate courts have applied various 
doctrines such as the "harmless error doctrine" to allow evidence otherwise acquired 
through unconstitutional means. See, e.g., State v. LePage, 630 P.2d 674 (Idaho 1981). 
In LePage, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the accused's Sixth Amendment rights 
were violated when a state agent deliberately elicited incriminating statements from 
him. Id. at 683-84. The court held, however, that the admission of the evidence was 
harmless error as the jury would have arrived at the same verdict had the evidence been 
excluded. See id. 
45. See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31, Viet., ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in RS.C., 
No.5 (Appendix 1985); see also Bruce E. Shemrock, Infancy and Maturity: A Compari­
son of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the United States Constitution, 
3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMPo L. 915, 916 (1997) (noting that individual rights were not 
addressed in the British North America Act). 
46. See Ibrahim V. The King, [1914] A.c. 599 (P.c. 1914) (appeal taken from 
H.K.), available at 1914 WL 18406. In Ibrahim, the Privy Council stated that "no state­
ment by an accused is admissible in evidence against him unless it is shewn by the 
prosecution to have been a voluntary statement, in the sense that it has not been ob­
tained from him either by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage exercised or held out 
by a person in authority." Id. at 609; see also R V. Rothman, [1981]1 S.C.R 640 (Can. 
1981), available at 1981 CarswellOnt 43 (Westlaw). 
47. Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960 S.c., ch. 44 (Can.). 
48. See Shemrock, supra note 45, at 916. 
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state conduct.49 This changed with the passage of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (Charter), a body of constitutionally en­
shrined legal rights enacted in 1982.50 The Charter applies to the 
actions of federal, provincial, territorial, and local government ac­
tors.51 Evidence obtained through unconstitutional means is not 
immediately excluded; a party seeking to exclude the evidence must 
further satisfy the requirements of s. 24(2) of the Charter.52 Absent 
some coercive conduct by the state that would render a defendant's 
incriminating statements involuntary, the Canadian common law 
confession rule permitted evidence to be admitted where an under­
cover state agent elicited incriminating statements from an accused 
during cell-plant interrogations. 53 Following the Charter's adop­
tion, the Supreme Court of Canada placed limitations on whether 
49. The Canadian Bill of Rights was an act of Parliament that granted individuals 
many of the same rights that would appear in the Charter twenty-two years later. ROB­
ERT J. SHARPE ET AL., THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 16-17 (2d ed. 2002). 
However, the Canadian Bill of Rights was deemed to have two key shortcomings that 
limited its impact. Id. at 17. First, it only applied to federal laws and federal actors and 
not to the laws or actions of provincial or local governments. Id. Second, many judges 
were reluctant to find other challenged parliamentary statutes to be violative of the 
Canadian Bill of Rights because they were not part of Canada's constitutional law. Id.; 
see also PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUllONAL LAW OF CANADA 699-701 (2004) (discuss­
ing the application of the Canadian Bill of Rights to federal laws and inconsistent fed­
eral statutes). 
50. See SHARPE ET AL., supra note 49, at 1-2, 45-46. 
51. Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 32, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.); see also HOGG, supra note 49, 
at 758. 
52. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 24(2) ("Where, in proceed­
ings under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner 
that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evi­
dence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, 
the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute."). In R. v. Collins, the Supreme Court of Canada enunciated three factors to 
assist courts in determining whether evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2). R. v. 
Collins (1987) 1 S.c.R. 265, '!I'll 46-50 (Can. 1987), available at 1987 Carswell BC 94 
(Westlaw). The first factor looks at whether the defendant's constitutional rights or 
freedoms were infringed upon or denied. Id. <JI<JI 26,32-34. The second factor relates to 
the impact of the admission of the illegally obtained evidence on the fairness of the 
trial. Id. <JI 47. The third factor is concerned with the impact that excluding the evidence 
would have on the repute of the administration of justice. Id. <JI<JI 50-51; see also R. v. 
Broyles, [1991] 3 S.c.R. 595, '!I'll 49-56 (Can. 1991), available at 1991 CarswellAlta 212 
(Westlaw); R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.c.R. 151, '!I'll 144-46 (Can. 1990), available at 1990 
CarswellYukon 7 (Westlaw). See generally DAVID PACIOCCO & LEE STUESSER, THE 
LAW OF EVIDENCE 273-312 (3d ed. 2002). 
53. R. v. Rothman, [1981] 1 S.c.R. 640, <JI<JI 51-53 (Can. 1981), available at 1981 
CarswellOnt 43 (Westlaw). 
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the State could use such methods to elicit incriminating statements 
under s. 7's right to silence.54 
Canadian courts apply a "purposive" approach to interpreting 
Charter provisions, including the right to silence.55 A purposive 
analysis of specific Charter provisions looks to the broader objec­
tives that underlie the provisions in question. 56 In Hebert, the 
Court looked to the underlying values that the right to silence was 
designed to protect and identified several key principles upon 
which it based its decision.57 The Court stated that the broad pur­
pose of the rights enshrined in ss. 7 through 14 of the Charter was 
"to preserve the rights of the detained individual, and to maintain 
the repute and integrity of [the] system of justice."58 With respect 
to the right to silence more specifically, the Court identified in gen­
eral terms the asymmetric power relationship between the state and 
a suspect whom the state has confined.59 This fundamental imbal­
ance permits the state to exercise its superior power to intrude on 
the individual's physical freedom by detaining her, thus leaving the 
54. Hebert, [1990] 2 s.c.R. 151. Hebert effectively overruled the Rothman deci­
sion on its facts. Id. <JI 116; see also Michael Brown, The American Approach to Cell 
Statements Makes Good Sense, in Hebert: A Constitutional Right to Silence-Two Com­
ments, 77 C.R.3d 1!J4, 1!J5 (1990) (stating that "[i]n overruling ... Rothman the Su­
preme Court of Canada has elevated the common law right to silence to a constitutional 
right under section 7 of the Charter"); David M. Tanovich, The Charter Right to Silence 
and the Unchartered Waters of a New Voluntary Confession Rule, 9 C.RAth 24, 25 
(1992) ("Hebert has effectively overturned Rothman."). 
55. Hunter v. Southam, Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, <JI<JI 18-20 (Can. 1984), available 
at 1984 Carswell Alta 412 (West law). In Hunter, the Court enunciated a fundamental 
"purposive" approach to interpreting constitutional provisions including the legal rights 
of suspects subject to criminal investigations. Id. The Hunter Court stated that the 
constitution must "be capable of growth and development over time to meet new social, 
political and historical realities often un imagined by its framers." Id. <JI 16. In Hunter, 
the Court specifically examined the underlying principles upon which the s. 8 "unrea­
sonable search and seizure" provisions were predicated, rather than merely determining 
the meaning of "reasonable" in the context of the provision. DON STUART, CHARTER 
JUSTICE IN CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW 5 (3d ed. 2001). Also, in R. v. Brydges, the Court 
applied the purposive approach when holding that the police had a duty under the right 
to counsel provision of s. 10(b) to inform an accused that she could consult legal aid 
after she had expressed doubt as to whether she could afford legal counsel. R. v. 
Brydges, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1990, <JI 13 (Can. 1990), available at 1990 CarswellAlta 3 
(Westlaw). The Court stated that s. 10 was purposively aimed '''at fostering the princi­
ples of adjudicative fairness,' one of which is 'the concern for fair treatment of an ac­
cused person.'" Id. (quoting R. v. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.c.R. 383, <JI<JI 23, 24 (Can. 1986), 
available at 1986 CarswellNB 14 (Westlaw». 
56. Hunter, [1984] 2 S.c.R. 145, <JI 18. 
57. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151, <JI<JI 118-23. 
58. Id. <JI 20. 
59. [d. <JI<JI 120-21. 
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suspect unable to simply walk away.60 The Court posited that 
"[t]his physical intrusion on the individual's mental liberty in turn 
may enable the state to infringe the individual's mental liberty by 
techniques made possible by its superior resources and power. "61 
This principle notwithstanding, the Hebert Court also acknowl­
edged that s. 7 requires an inherent and critical balancing of inter­
ests between the state and the individua1.62 The Court advanced 
that the state has a legitimate interest in performing its law enforce­
ment duties and is permitted to deprive the suspect of her rights, 
provided it comports with the principles of "fundamental justice. "63 
In Canada and the United States, investigative techniques that 
were once permissible are now constitutionally restricted by s. 7's 
right to silence and the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. The 
next section of this Article discusses the scope of these protections 
in the context of cell-plant interrogations. 
B. Textual Language of the Constitutional Provisions 
The discussion surrounding the scope of s. 7 and the Sixth 
Amendment must begin with a review of the textual language of 
these constitutional protections. Section 7 states that "[ e ]veryone 
has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right 
not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles 
of fundamental justice."64 Textually, the temporal and spatial as­
pects of s. 7's protections (that is, when and where they are opera­
tive) are not confined to criminal matters or trials.65 Furthermore, 
fundamental justice is a seemingly broad notion that the Supreme 
Court of Canada has interpreted to include the concepts of both 
procedural fairness as well as substantive fairness. 66 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 1120. 
62. Id. 1 121. 
63. Id. 
64. Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.). 
65. Indeed, s. 7 has also been applied to civil matters. See, e.g., New Brunswick 
Minister of Health & Cmty. Servs. v. G. (J.), [1999] 3 S.c.R. 46 (Can. 1999), available at 
1999 CarswellNB 305 (Westlaw); B. (R.) v. Children's Aid Soc'y of Metro. Toronto, 
[1995] 1 S.c.R. 315 (Can. 1995), available at 1995 CarswellOnt 105 (Westlaw). 
66. In a notable 1985 case, the Supreme Court of Canada held that fundamental 
justice incorporated not only the notion of procedural justice, but that of substantive 
fairness. See Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.c.R. 486 (Can. 1985), available at 
1985 CarswellBC 398 (Westlaw). As certain scholars point out, there were assumptions 
at the time the Charter was promulgated that the concept of fundamental justice was 
restricted to procedural justice. See SHARPE ET AL., supra note 49, at 185. 
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The Sixth Amendment's Right to Counsel Clause provides that 
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
... have the assistance of counsel for his defense."67 Unlike the 
broad language of s. 7, the entire Sixth Amendment seems specifi­
cally to refer to the rights of a defendant in the context of criminal 
trials, and, notably, not to interrogations, surreptitious or otherwise, 
which take place outside of trial.68 From a temporal perspective, 
the text of the Sixth Amendment seems limited to the period of the 
court proceedings surrounding the prosecution of the accused, 
while spatially, it would appear that the protection is effective in 
court, but not outside of trial. 
Juxtaposing s. 7 and the Sixth Amendment, it becomes imme­
diately noticeable that from a strictly textual vantage point, the for­
mer provides an accused with potentially more protection than the 
latter because s. 7 is not textually confined to criminal proceedings 
and to the rights of the accused during trial.69 Thus, one might nat­
urally assume that s. 7 would potentially provide a greater degree of 
protection for an accused subject to cell-plant interrogations. Juris­
prudence, however, demonstrates otherwise. 
C. Temporal and Spatial Scope of Protections 
Canadian and United States jurisprudence have provided a 
greater depth of understanding to the temporal and spatial scopes 
of the s. 7 right to silence and Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
Turning first to the Sixth Amendment, the right to counsel becomes 
operative upon the initiation of formal criminal proceedings with 
respect to a particular crime.70 Formal proceedings may be initi­
ated "by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, in­
formation, or arraignment,"71 and does not begin prior to any of 
67. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
68. [d. The full text of the Sixth Amendment reads as follows: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer­
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
[d. (emphases added). Read in its entirety, the language makes specific references to 
the rights afforded to an accused at her criminal trial. 
69. See SHARPE ET AL., supra note 49, at 179-80. 
70. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 177 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
71. Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 523 (2004) (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 
430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977)). In Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578 (2008), the 
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these events.72 Thus, if an undercover police officer were to elicit 
incriminating statements from an accused prior to the commence­
ment of formal proceedings with respect to the crime for which in­
criminating statements were elicited, the Sixth Amendment would 
not apply and the statements would be admissible.73 
The temporal limitation of the Sixth Amendment's application 
to post-formal proceeding questioning notwithstanding, its spatial 
scope is limitless; it is not confined, for example, to questioning that 
takes place within a judicial proceeding or by police officers during 
a custodial interrogation in a detention settingJ4 Where an agent 
of the state elicits incriminating statements from an accused in a 
Court held that a defendant's initial appearance before a magistrate judge activates the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel protection. This is so even where the prosecutor is 
neither present during this appearance nor even aware that it is taking place. Id. A 
Federal Court of Appeals has held that formal proceedings commenced when the de­
fendant was charged with a complaint rather than by indictment. See Manning v. Bow­
ersox, 310 F.3d 571, 575 (8th Cir. 2002). 
72. But cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964). In Escobedo, the 
Court determined that the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel applied even prior to 
the commencement of formal proceedings when an investigation was no longer a gen­
eral inquiry into an unsolved crime and had begun to focus on a particular individual. 
Id. This decision preceded Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and once Miranda 
was decided two years later, Escobedo was effectively sidelined as a precedent for pro­
viding suspects with protections during a police interrogation. See Yale Kamisar, 
Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda' What Is "Interrogation?" When Does it Mat­
ter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1,26 (1978) (noting that Escobedo was quickly "shoved offstage" by 
Miranda). Furthermore, Escobedo's extension into the pre-formal proceedings period 
does not seem to have been followed by subsequent Court decisions. See, e.g., Fellers, 
540 U.S. 519 (providing examples of subsequent cases where the Court explicitly reaf­
firmed that the Sixth Amendment applied only once formal proceedings had attached); 
Brewer, 430 U.S. 387 (same). 
73. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 300 (1990). This unfortunate restriction 
on scope may have unfair results. For example, if an undercover state agent were to 
take active steps to elicit incriminating statements from an accused by asking a series of 
questions normally asked in a non-undercover interrogation, such conduct would result 
in a Sixth Amendment violation if the conduct took place after formal proceedings had 
commenced. However, were the very same interrogation to take place prior to the 
commencement of formal proceedings, the statements would be admitted. 
74. See, e.g., Fellers, 540 U.S. at 524-25. This is distinct from the Fifth Amend­
ment Miranda protections embedded within the Self-Incrimination Clause. See Mi­
randa, 384 U.S. 436. In Miranda, the Court stated that "[b]y custodial interrogation, we 
mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken 
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. 
at 444. In a subsequent decision, the Court further clarified that "the term 'interroga­
tion' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or 
actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and 
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response from the suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (footnote 
omitted). 
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location such as a co-defendant's car,75 a police informant's house,76 
or in the accused's home,77 such deliberate acts of elicitation will 
still likely be found in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 
The s. 7 right to silence, despite its seemingly broad textual 
language, has been restricted by the Supreme Court of Canada.78 
Within the context of cell-plant interrogations, the right to silence is 
effective, both temporally and spatially, only after an accused is 
placed into detention79 and remains in effect for the duration of the 
accused's confinement.8o The spatial limitation in the s. 7 jurispru­
dence seems inconsistent in light of the Charter's broad language, 
75. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 203, 206 (1964). 
76. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S 159, 167 (1985) (noting that "[a]t the trial, the 
State did not offer into evidence anything from the recorded telephone conversations, 
but did offer portions of the tapes of the December 26 meeting, principally those in­
volving direct discussion of the thefts for which Moulton was originally indicted"); see 
also Brief of Respondent at *7, Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S 159 (1985) (No. 84-786), 
1985 WL 667858. 
77. Fellers, 540 U.S. at 521, 524-25. 
78. See R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151, 'll'lI 129-33 (Can. 1990), available at 1990 
Carswell Yukon 7 (Westlaw). This is not surprising for the courts must then naturally 
balance the rights of the state against those of an individual whose rights have been 
deprived under s. 7. Id. 'll'lI 121, 128. 
79. Id. 'lI13l. The right to silence does not then extend to undercover operations 
prior to detention where a suspect, whether under indictment or otherwise, makes in­
criminating statements to state agents, even where such statements have been actively 
elicited. See id.; see also id. 'lI 31 ("Prior to the time that an adversary relationship 
exists between the state and the individual, the right to remain silent has not attached 
and undercover police work may proceed unhindered."). Notably, this is substantially 
the same limitation that applies to the s. 10 right-to-counsel provision. Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, §lO(b), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.) ("Everyone has the right on arrest or detention ... 
to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right ...."). For 
a discussion on s. 10, see STUART, supra note 55, at 284-306. 
80. Cell-plant interrogations take place while suspects are incarcerated and, 
therefore, are clearly in detention. However, detention, at least in the context of other 
Charter rights such as the s. lO(b) right to counsel, can take place outside of incarcera­
tion. For instance, in R. v. Thomsen, the Court determined that an individual who was 
required to submit to a roadside breathalyzer test was detained for s. 10 purposes. R. v. 
Thomsen, [1988] 1 S.c.R. 640, 'lI 17 (Can. 1988), available at 1988 CarswellOnt 53 
(Westlaw). However, it is unclear whether an individual who is the subject of a surrep­
titious interrogation by an undercover state agent while not incarcerated, but neverthe­
less confined in some way, is in detention for s. 7 purposes. As recently as 2007, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal stated that it was conceivable that an individual might not be 
in detention, but still may remain subject to state control in circumstances functionally 
equivalent to detention. See R. v. Osmar, 84 O.R.3d 321, 'lI 42 (Ont. A.c. 2007) (Can.), 
available at 2007 CarswellOnt 339 (Westlaw). Yet the court did not provide any exam­
ples of what such circumstances might be. See id. It is not out of the realm of possibil­
ity, for example, to contemplate a scenario where a suspect who is arrested and 
confined in a police car following arrest is in detention for s. 7 purposes. In such a 
scenario, the police could feasibly place in the car with the accused an undercover of­
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which seeks to limit government deprivations of life, liberty, and 
security, except in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice.81 
The spatial limitations imposed by the Supreme Court of Ca­
nada on the right to silence, despite the broad language of s. 7, may 
be reasonable. The importance of the right to silence (and the right 
to counsel) in the context of the cell-plant interrogations is clear: 
the accused is subject to the coercive pressures inherent to custody 
and has no power to choose with whom she will be confined.82 For 
example, individuals who have no experience being incarcerated 
are particularly vulnerable in such situations to cell-plant interroga­
tions. Law enforcement authorities can place informants or under­
cover officers into a jail cell who will manipulate an accused into 
making inculpatory statements. By engaging in jailhouse bravado, 
the accused may be cajoled into responding in kind with her own 
recitation of illicit deeds or risk losing face. Where an accused is 
surreptitiously interrogated outside of custody, she is not subjected 
to the same coercive pressures as someone confined by the state. 
This is contrasted with the situation of an accused released on bail 
because this individual is free to choose whom she speaks with 
about her alleged crimes. Therefore, while the spatial limitation of 
the right to silence might not seem to comport with the broad lan­
guage of s. 7, it is arguably a reasonable limitation because custody 
presents heightened dangers and an increased power imbalance be­
tween the state and the accused. 
ficer, who is pretending to be someone who has also been arrested, who then subjects 
the accused to an interrogation or its functional equivalent. 
81. See supra note 79. In an article written prior to the Hebert decision, Professor 
Patrick Healy argued that a constitutional right to silence should be embedded within s. 
7 as opposed to s. 10(b), for the latter would limit the right to silence to detention and 
arrest. See Patrick Healy, The Value of Silence, 74 C.R.3d 176, 180 (1990). Given that 
the text of s. 7 does not specifically limit its effect to instances of arrest or detention, the 
Hebert Court could have extended the right to silence to periods not encapsulated by 
detention. See id.; see also Gordon Wall, Doubts Cast on Hebert Limits on the Pre- Trial 
Right to Silence, 36 C.R.4th 134, 142 (1995) ("On the proper facts, the Supreme Court 
should have no hesitation in abandoning the detention limit and exceeding the right to 
silence to any person questioned by the police regarding an offence which the person is 
suspected of having committed."). However, the Court has not yet abandoned its de­
tention limitation. See Patrick Healy, The Right to Remain Silent: Value Added, But 
How Much?, in Hebert· A Constitutional Right to Silence-Two Comments, supra note 
54, at 200-01. 
82. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of these issues. 
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D. Subject Matter Scope of the Protections 
The Sixth Amendment's right to counsel provision is "offense 
specific."83 As the United States Supreme Court reiterated in Texas 
v. Cobb, the right to counsel only excludes incriminating statements 
procured through unlawful interrogations related to crimes for 
which formal proceedings have been initiated.84 Therefore, if an 
accused is indicted for robbery, and the police conduct a cell-plant 
interrogation using an informant who elicits incriminating state­
ments about the robbery, those statements will be excluded from 
evidence. However, if the informant also elicits statements regard­
ing a murder that the accused committed during the same robbery, 
but for which formal proceedings had not yet been initiated, such 
statements regarding the murder would not be excluded. This is 
true regardless of the fact that the murder took place during the 
robbery and was factually related to the robbery.8s 
In contrast, nothing in the Supreme Court of Canada's cell­
plant decisions specifically limits the application of the right to si­
lence to the crimes for which the individuals are arrested or 
charged. From a policy perspective, the right to silence should not 
be so limited. Unlike the Sixth Amendment, s. 7 is not limited to 
criminal prosecutions where the state has brought formal charges 
against an accused. Furthermore, the pressures inherent to custo­
dial environments are such that a skilled cell-plant interrogator will 
assuredly extract incriminating information about other crimes to a 
83. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 164 (2001). 
84. See id. at 167-68. However, the Court also held "that when the Sixth Amend­
ment right to counsel attaches, it does encompass offenses that, even if not formally 
charged, would be considered the same offense under the Blockburger test. [d. at 173. 
Blockburger held that '''where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two 
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two 
offenses or one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does 
not.''' [d. (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)). Generally, 
the protection attaches once formal proceedings have been commenced against a defen­
dant with respect to a particular offense. See id. at 167-68. Thus, police may not ques­
tion a suspect with respect to a particular offense for which formal proceedings have 
commenced in the absence of counsel. See id. However, the protection does not apply 
where the police interrogate a suspect for a crime for which formal proceedings have 
not yet been initiated. In such cases, the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination protec­
tion is operative and the suspect must be "Mirandized." See id. at 17l. 
85. [d. This is notably different from the Miranda protection covering any crime 
the police may address during a custodial interrogation. As the Supreme Court of the 
United States has stated, the Miranda protection exists "to counteract the inherent 
pressures of custodial interrogation, which ... exist regardless of the number of crimes 
under investigation or whether those crimes have resulted in formal charges." Arizona 
v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 685 (1988). 
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suspect's detriment. If the fundamental principle underlying the 
right to silence is the accused's right to choose not to speak to au­
thorities about matters that may incriminate him, such a principle is 
undermined by engaging in such legal hairsplitting. An accused 
should be entitled to counsel whenever she is under arrest or de­
tained by the state and questioned about any crimes for which she 
may be prosecuted. 
E. Illustrating the Scope of Protection 
The following hypothetical scenarios illustrate the different ap­
proaches under Canadian and United States law with respect to the 
spatial, temporal, and subject matter elements of the constitutional 
protections in question. 
1. Hypothetical I 
Albert is arrested for murder and is brought in for questioning. 
He invokes both his rights to counsel and silence and refuses to 
speak with the police.86 Albert is placed in a jail cell while awaiting 
his arraignment. No formal proceedings have been initiated against 
Albert for any crime. The police place Randall, an undercover po­
lice officer, in Albert's jail cell for a twenty-four hour period. Dur­
ing that same period, Randall establishes a relationship of trust with 
Albert by discussing his own alleged crimes and his connections 
outside of jail. Randall suggests to Albert that his connections may 
be of assistance to him. Albert, as a result of Randall's overtures, 
feels comfortable sharing personal information with Randall. Seiz­
ing the moment, Randall asks Albert certa,in questions that elicit 
86. It should be noted that under s. 7, the Supreme Court of Canada has expressly 
held that an accused does not have to invoke his right to silence prior to a cell-plant 
interrogation in order for it to be operational. See R. v. Liew, [1999] 3 S.c.R. 227, 'j[<J[ 
44,45 (Can. 1999), available at 1999 CarswellAlta 821 (Westlaw). Although the United 
States Supreme Court has not made any similar declaration with respect to the right to 
counsel in the context of surreptitious interrogations, there is some precedent to suggest 
it might rule similarly. See Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004). In Fellers, the 
police went to the accused's home to arrest him pursuant to an arrest warrant and 
following the initiation of formal judicial proceedings. Without invoking his right to 
counsel, the accused made incriminating statements regarding the crime for which pro­
ceedings had been initiated. Id. at 520-21. The Court held that since formal proceed­
ings had attached, the statements were procured in violation of Fellers's right to 
counsel. Id. at 525. According to the facts, no invocation of his right to counsel seemed 
to have been made prior to his utterance of the incriminating statements. By implica­
tion, it is reasonable to suggest, therefore, that the absence of an invocation of the right 
to counsel does not deprive such individuals of their Sixth Amendment rights, whether 
in the cell-plant context or otherwise. 
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incriminating responses about the crimes for which Albert has been 
arrested. The incriminating information is later used by the prose­
cutor against Albert. 
Applying s. 7 to these facts and assuming that the state agency 
and elicitation prongs are otherwise satisfied,87 the temporal and 
spatial triggers of the right to silence would be satisfied. Albert was 
questioned by a state agent while in detention. Had these facts 
taken place in the United States, however, Albert's statements 
would have been admitted into evidence at his trial. Under the 
Sixth Amendment, the right to counsel would not protect Albert 
from his cell plant as formal proceedings had not been initiated 
against him when his statements were elicited. 
2. Hypothetical II 
Assume the same basic facts as above, except that Randall is 
sent in to surreptitiously interrogate Albert only after Albert has 
been arraigned and has pled not guilty. Assume also that Randall 
elicits incriminating statements with respect to the crime of murder 
for which formal proceedings have been initiated against Albert. 
Under Canadian law, Albert would still be able to successfully 
prove a s. 7 violation, as the interrogation would have taken place 
while he was in detention. As indicated above, the commencement 
of formal adversarial judicial proceedings does not impact the ap­
plication of the Charter's right to silence. Of course, Albert would 
still have to show that the evidence should be excluded under s. 
24(2),88 and he would likely be successful given that the evidence 
obtained was conscriptive in nature.89 Therefore the result in Hy­
pothetical I would likely be the same as in Hypothetical II under 
these facts with respect to the application of s. 7. 
87. See infra Parts III-IV for a discussion of the state agency and elicitation 
prongs. 
88. For a discussion of s. 24(2), see supra note 52. 
89. As the Supreme Court of Canada has stated: 

[W]here ... an accused is conscripted to give evidence against himself after 

clearly electing not to do so by use of an unfair trick practised by the authori­

ties, and where the resultant statement is the only evidence against him, one 

must surely conclude that reception of the evidence would render the trial 
unfair. 
R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S. C. R. 151, 'II 147 (Can. 1990), available at 1990 CarswellYukon 
7 (Westlaw). Conscriptive evidence refers to evidence that persons have been com­
pelled to provide against themselves. See PACIOCCO & STUESSER, supra note 52, at 
230-31, 365. 
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However, with these facts the results under the Sixth Amend­
ment would be radically different than in Hypothetical I. Here, for­
mal proceedings have been initiated for the crime to which the 
elicited statements referred, and Albert's Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel has attached. Therefore, Albert's post-arraignment elic­
ited statements would be excluded.90 
Under these facts, Albert would be able to seek protection 
under both Canadian and United States constitutional law. Cana­
dian and United States precedents are consonant, assuming the 
state agency and elicitation prongs of each country's legal tests have 
been met, when cell-plant interrogation takes place while the ac­
cused is in detention and when formal proceedings have been initi­
ated with respect to the crimes about which the police elicit 
incriminating information. 
3. Hypothetical III 
Albert is arrested for murder and gives no statement to the 
police. The police decide not to send in a state agent to surrepti­
tiously interrogate Albert. Albert is arraigned and released on bail. 
The police employ Brian, the co-defendant in Albert's case who is a 
long-time friend, to elicit incriminating statements from Albert. 
Brian, who is represented by different counsel, is equipped with a 
wire and visits Albert at his home. In their discussions, Brian elicits 
incriminating statements from Albert regarding the murder. 
Under a s. 7 analysis, the conduct of the authorities in this hy­
pothetical would not amount to a Charter violation as the surrepti­
tious questioning took place outside of detention.91 While Albert 
would not receive protection under s. 7 based on the facts of this 
hypothetical scenario, he would be protected under the spatial 
scope of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel following the pre­
cedent of Massiah.92 However, if Brian elicited incriminating state­
90. These facts are similar to those of United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), 
in which the defendant admitted his guilt to a fellow prisoner who was a government 
informant. Id. at 266. The Court held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights 
were violated when incriminating statements he made to the informant were used in his 
prosecution. Id. at 272-73. 
91. See, e.g., R. v. Unger, 82 Man. R.2d 244 (Man. O.B. 1992) (Can.), available at 
1992 CarswellMan 336 (Westlaw). 
92. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). These facts are similar to 
those in Massiah, wherein the codefendant, acting as an undisclosed government agent, 
elicited incriminating statements from the defendant. The Court held that the incrimi­
nating statements were inadmissible as they were procured in violation of the defen­
dant's right to counsel. Id. at 206. 
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ments about other crimes for which formal proceedings had not yet 
been initiated, those statements would not be excluded and may be 
admitted into evidence at Albert's trial in accordance with Texas v. 
Cobb.93 
F. Concluding Thoughts on the Scope of Protection 
The temporal, spatial, and subject matter scopes of the s. 7 
right to silence provide a more balanced and practical approach to 
providing rights to an accused than those of the Sixth Amendment. 
Section 7 protects an accused against cell-plant interrogations dur­
ing detention. It is thus operational when an accused is potentially 
most vulnerable: when she first enters the detention environment 
and her choice of persons to speak to is limited. At present, the 
right to silence is not limited to incriminating statements respecting 
crimes for which an accused has been arrested or for which formal 
proceedings have commenced. It, therefore, is not an offense-spe­
cific protection. Although the Sixth Amendment provides greater 
spatial coverage than s. 7, it only begins after the commencement of 
formal proceedings and fails to protect an accused from overreach­
ing activity prior to that period. Furthermore, its protection does 
not extend to other crimes, even those that are factually related to 
the crime for which formal proceedings have commenced against 
the accused. 
III. STATE AGENCY 
In both Canada and the United States, in order to have state­
ments excluded, an accused must show that they were elicited by an 
agent of the state. However, each country utilizes different criteria 
to determine the presence or absence of an agency relationship be­
tween the state and a putative agent. The Supreme Court of Ca­
nada's test looks to the material impact of the state's intervention 
on the exchange between the accused and the state agent. In con­
trast, United States judicial interpretations of state agency focus on 
whether a contractual relationship between the informant and the 
state has been created. A comparative analysis of these legal tests, 
as applied to cell-plant interrogations, establishes that the Canadian 
model is a preferable and more realistic approach to providing con­
stitutional rights to an accused. The Canadian interpretation of 
state agency is also a more purposive approach because it provides 
93. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001); supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
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greater protection to an accused, and thus significantly limits law 
enforcement's ability to circumvent an accused's constitutional 
rights. 
A. 	 The General Factors: Intervention of the State v. Contractual 
Relationships 
To date, the United States Supreme Court has not formulated 
a bright-line test to determine the existence of a state agency rela­
tionship with respect to the application of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel in cell-plant interrogations.94 Consequently, vari­
ous state and federal courts in the United States have developed 
disparate interpretations of state agency based on their understand­
ing of the factual circumstances of United States v. Henry, the Su­
preme Court's first cell-plant interrogation case.95 In Henry, 
federal law enforcement officers formed an agreement with Nich­
ols, a jailhouse informant, who elicited incriminating statements 
from the accused about his participation in an armed bank 
robbery.96 
The Henry Court focused on certain factors to determine that 
an agency relationship existed between the state and Nichols.97 
First, Nichols was paid on a contingent-fee basis and thus would 
only be paid if he produced incriminating information about 
Henry.98 Lower courts are split as to whether an agreement must 
be in writing. and expressly stipulate the form of remuneration in 
advance or whether such agreements can be implied from the cir­
cumstances without the form of compensation being offered.99 Sec­
94. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has noted, 
"no 'bright line test for determining whether an individual is a Government agent for 
purposes of the Sixth Amendment' has emerged." Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 
1012, 1020 (11th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Taylor, 800 F.2d 1012, 1015 (10th 
Cir. 1986»; see also Jackson v. State, 643 A.2d 1360, 1374 (Del. 1994). In Jackson, the 
Delaware Supreme Court stated: '''State agent' for Sixth Amendment purposes defies 
easy definition. The Supreme Court's major Sixth Amendment right to counsel opin­
ions ... do not define the term, focusing instead on the method of gathering informa­
tion." Id. 
95. See Henry, 447 U.S. at 270. 
96. [d. at 267. 
97. Id. at 270. 
98. [d. 
99. See Randolph v. California, 380 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that an 
explicit agreement is not necessary). But see United States v. Malik, 680 F.2d 1162, 
1165 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that an inmate who acquired information from the defen­
dant, even though the inmate had previously been a paid informant for the government, 
was not a state agent because the inmate's relationship with the government had been 
broken off before the information was acquired); United States v. Van Scoy, 654 F.2d 
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ond, although Nichols was informed by the authorities that they 
were interested in receiving information about various federal de­
tainees in the local jail, Henry was specifically identified as one of 
these individuals. lOo This has also produced further disparities 
among United States jurisdictions on the question of whether gov­
ernment authorities have to identify a specific accused to its agent 
prior to the agent's eliciting incriminating statements in order for a 
Sixth Amendment violation to be found. 
In contrast to its United States counterpart, the Supreme Court 
of Canada has formulated more specific and comprehensive legal 
tests to determine the existence of a state agency relationship. In 
instances where undercover police officers or prison guards elicit 
incriminating statements from an accused, the Court has expressly 
held that such individuals are state agents for s. 7 purposes.IOI The 
more challenging state agency questions arise where the incriminat­
ing statements are elicited by a jailhouse informant or even by a 
friend of an accused. For instance, in R. v. Broyles, the accused was 
arrested and detained for the murder of his grandmother.lo2 Failing 
to obtain inculpatory statements from Broyles, police persuaded 
Ritter, a friend of the accused, to visit Broyles in jail. Ritter suc­
cessfully elicited incriminating statements from Broyles about the 
murder.lo3 Unlike typical cell-plant state agents such as undercover 
police officers and jailhouse informants, Ritter was not provided 
any remuneration or benefit in exchange for obtaining the 
information.104 
While United States jurisprudence has focused on the exis­
tence of a contractual relationship, the Broyles Court instead em­
phasized the material impact that the state agency relationship must 
have on the exchange between the putative state agent and the ac­
cused in order for state agency to be found. lo5 It stated: "[w]ould 
the exchange between the accused and the informer have taken 
257,260-61 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that an inmate who was previously an informant for 
the government was not a state agent at the time he acquired the incriminating informa­
tion from the defendant). 
100. Henry, 447 U.S. at 254 n.8. 
101. See R. v. Broyles, [1991] 3 S.c.R. 595, 'lI 27 (Can. 1991), available at 1991 
CarswellAlta 212 (Westlaw). 
102. Id. 'lI 3. 
103. Id. 'lI 4. 
104. /d. 
105. Id. 'lI 30 ("Only if the relationship between the informer and the state is such 
that the exchange between the informer and the accused is materially different from 
what it would have been had there been no such relationship should the informer be 
considered a state agent for the purposes of the exchange."). 
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place, in the form and manner in which it did take place, but for the 
intervention of the state or its agents?"106 But for the state's inter­
vention, the conversations between Broyles and Ritter would not 
have occurred. 
The Broyles Court also foresaw that even where there is no 
pre-existing relationship between the state and a putative agent at 
the time the elicitation takes place, there may be instances where 
the state will "make it known" that it will reward an informant for 
acquiring incriminating information from other inmates.107 The 
Court asserted that the test in such circumstances would be whether 
"the exchange between the informer and the accused [would] have 
taken place but for the inducements of the authorities."lo8 Thus, 
where the state provides an inducement, such conduct may give rise 
to a finding of state agency and does not allow the state to so easily 
circumvent an accused's rights by asserting the absence of a formal 
agreement or offer of payment in exchange for producing incrimi­
nating evidence. 
The following subsections discuss in greater detail the dispa­
rate approaches to state agency found in United States jurispru­
dence to demonstrate how the Canadian tests articulated in Broyles 
may help avoid these jurisdictional splits and simultaneously ad­
vance a more logical approach to constitutional protection in these 
contexts. 
B. Offer of Remuneration 
Rooted in the holding of the Henry decision, numerous courts 
have found that the state agency prong will not be satisfied unless 
there is a contractual agreement setting out the terms of remunera­
tion between the state and the informant.1°9 Although in Henry, 
the informant Nichols received money, courts have recognized that 
106. Id. (emphasis added). 
107. Id. 'lI 32. 
108. Id. 
109. See, e.g., United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1357 (7th Cir. 1991), overruled 
on other grounds by Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 1999). The Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has stated that "there is no agency absent the govern­
ment's agreement to reward the informant for his services." Id. However, the York 
court also stated that an agreement need not "be explicit or formal, and [can be] in­
ferred from evidence that the parties behaved as though there were an agreement be­
tween them, following a particular course of conduct over a sustained period of time." 
Id. 
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other forms of consideration can be offered.110 Given the depriva­
tions that inmates experience in confinement, there are various 
types of remuneration that law enforcement officers can offer to a 
willing informant to induce him to inform on another inmate. 
These could include material benefits while in detention, preferen­
tial treatment, or, for example, a reduced sentence.lli In United 
States v. Sampat, an informant employed by the state was given 
probation in exchange for providing information about the ac­
cused,112 As the Sampat court noted, freedom is "a commodity 
more precious than money."113 
Whatever the form of remuneration, some United States courts 
require that the consideration be expressly offered at the outset.114 
This effectively requires that an accused prove that law enforce­
ment officers formalized an agreement with an informant prior to 
the elicitation. Consequently, law enforcement could easily circum­
vent the creation of an agency relationship by simply mentioning to 
an informant its interest in receiving information about a given ac­
cused without formally offering any compensation to the 
informant.lls 
Other federal and state courts have found that implied con­
tracts between an informant and law enforcement are sufficient to 
create an agency relationship,116 even where the compensation is 
not expressly offered,117 Indeed, when the state creates an expecta­
tion in the informant that he will receive some remuneration, such 
action should be sufficient to find an agency relationship,118 In 
110. See, e.g., United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 424 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that 
the informant apparently acted "on the reasonable assumption that government offi­
cials were aware of his actions and would reward him in the future, if not presently, with 
a recommendation for a reduction in his sentence"). 
111. [d. at 423 n.5. 
112. United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 634-36 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
113. [d. at 638. 
114. Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012, 1020-21 (11th Cir. 1987); Thomas v. 
Cox, 708 F.2d 132, 134-36 (4th Cir. 1983); State v. Swinton, 847 A.2d 921, 966 (Conn. 
2004); Commonwealth v. Rancourt, 503 N.E.2d 960, 963-64 (Mass. 1987). 
115. See Maia Goodell, Government Responsibility for the Acts ofJailhouse Infor­
mants Under the Sixth Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2525, 2547 (2003) (noting that 
"[r]efusing to consider more informal agreements ignores the reality of these arrange­
ments, where an implication can carry as much force as an explicit promise"). 
116. Randolph v. California, 380 FJd 1133, 1144 (9th Cir. 2004); Commonwealth 
v. Franciscus, 710 A.2d 1112, 1120 (Pa. 1998); Commonwealth v. Moose, 602 A.2d 1265, 
1270-71 (Pa. 1992). 
117. See supra note 109. 
118. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated, "[i]n the absence of a reward, 
whether it be pecuniary in nature or in the form of an agreement to testify [favorably] 
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United States v. Brink, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit noted that the informant, Scott, may have informed 
on the accused because he reasonably believed that he would re­
ceive a reduced sentence.119 The court observed that the govern­
ment had trained Scott to be an informant and advised him that his 
cooperation would be reported to the United States Attorney and 
the Attorney General.120 After Scott began his duties as an inform­
ant, he was placed in a jail cell with the accused and was later ap­
proached by a state trooper who asked if Brink had given any 
information about his alleged crime.121 Scott informed the trooper 
about Brink's incriminating statements, which were admitted at 
triaJ.122 The Brink court concluded that, given Scott's "propensity 
to act" as an informant and his placement in the cell with the ac­
cused, it was reasonable to infer a deliberate effort by the state to 
obtain incriminating information, notwithstanding that Scott was 
never specifically offered any remuneration at the outset.123 
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit held that an informant's cooperation rendered him a state 
agent even absent an explicit agreement. In Randolph v. Califor­
nia, the informant, Moore, elicited incriminating statements from 
the accused, Randolph, a developmentally disabled inmate with an 
IQ of fifty-nine. 124 The prosecutor and police officer who were in­
terested in receiving incriminating information about Randolph ex­
plicitly told Moore not to expect anything in exchange for his 
testimony,125 The Ninth Circuit determined that although he was 
not offered any specific remuneration, "[I]t is clear that Moore 
hoped to receive leniency and that, acting on that hope, he cooper­
ated with the State."126 The court held that: 
an explicit agreement to compensate Moore is not necessary to a 
finding that Moore acted as an agent of the State. There is suffi­
regarding the informant's assistance to the police, there would be no incentive for infor­
mants to aid law enforcement agencies." Franciscus, 710 A.2d at 1120. 
119. United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 424 (3rd Cir. 1994); see supra note 110. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. [d. at 421. 
123. /d. at 424. 
124. Randolph v. California, 380 F.3d 1133, 1144 (9th Cir. 2004). That Randolph 
was developmentally disabled would seem to be another compelling reason why the 
Sixth Amendment should have been applied more vigorously. He was likely more vul­
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cient undisputed evidence to show that the State made a con­
scious decision to obtain Moore's cooperation and that Moore 
consciously decided to provide that cooperation. That coopera­
tion rendered Moore an agent of the State. 127 
Both Brink and Randolph represent the most realistic and pur­
posive judicial approaches to the creation of agency relationships. 
Henry demonstrated that the state could not circumvent an ac­
cused's right to counsel once formal proceedings had commenced 
by surreptitiously interrogating a defendant who was unaware that 
an interrogation was occurring.128 To define state agency narrowly, 
as some United States courts have done, effectively permits law en­
forcement officials to circumvent the spirit of the Henry protection. 
Yet even if most courts were to follow the Randolph and Brink 
approaches to this aspect of state agency, they would still not en­
compass situations in which the state is assisted by friends or family 
members of an accused who procure inculpatory statements with 
neither promise nor expectation of compensation for such coopera­
tion. In so doing, the state acts in a surreptitious manner by seeking 
to obtain information through deceptive means that it could not ob­
tain through regular police interrogation procedures. Furthermore, 
in deploying a friend or family member, the state exploits a rela­
tionship of trust between the accused and an agent from whom an 
inmate, given her confinement, is likely to seek solace. Therefore, 
the Canadian approach under Broyles offers greater protection to a 
vulnerable accused than the United States approach, even under 
Brink and Randolph. 
C. Government Instructions to Target a Specific Accused 
An agency relationship typically involves the existence of a 
principal who exercises control over its agents' actions.129 In the 
context of cell-plant interrogations, United States courts are di­
vided about the degree to which such control needs to be mani­
fested. 130 This division turns on whether state authorities need to 
127. [d. 
128. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980). 
129. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) ("Agency is the fidu­
ciary relationship that arises when one person (a "principal") manifests assent to an­
other person (an "agent") that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject 
to the principal's control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to 
act."). 
130. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 338 F.3d 918 (8th CiT. 2003); United 
States v. LaB are, 191 F.3d 60 (1st CiT. 1999); United States v. Birbal, 113 F.3d 342 (2d 
CiT. 1997). 
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instruct an informant to elicit information from a particular accused 
or if the informant can act as an agent-at-Iarge.131 Courts in some 
jurisdictions hold that a specific targeting requirement is necessary 
to prove a Sixth Amendment violation.132 At the same time, other 
courts have found such distinctions inconsequential.133 
Contractual relationships between the state and an informant 
may be established in writing or implied from the circumstances.134 
However, even where such agreements are written, they might not 
state the name of the individual about whom the informant is ex­
pected to obtain information. The recognition of an agency rela­
tionship should not depend on whether the name of the accused has 
been brought to the informant's attention, but instead whether the 
agent is engaged in obtaining incriminating information in further­
ance of the principal's prosecutorial and investigatory interests.135 
Nevertheless, some courts have found that even where a written 
agreement creates an agency relationship, the agreement should 
also provide the names of specific individuals about whom informa­
131. Once again, this ambiguity arises from the United States Supreme Court's 
lack of clear parameters in defining agency. While the facts in both Massiah and Henry 
involved law enforcement officials expressly pointing out the accused to their inform­
ant, nothing in those decisions called for a targeting requirement as a matter of law. See 
Henry, 447 U.S. at 268; Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 202-03 (1984). As Maia 
Goodell asserts, 
[tJhe underlying rationale for the Massiah and Henry line of cases does not 
support a targeting requirement. Both the pursuit of truth and the normative 
authority of the criminal court require that the defendants not be subject to 
questioning by undercover government informants at large, with free rein to 
question them in the absence of counsel. 
Goodell, supra note 115, at 2541. Furthermore, in Henry, Justice Blackmun observed 
that "Henry was only one of several federal detainees to whom Nichols was to pay 
attention; this is not a case in which officers singled out a specific target." Henry, 447 
U.S. at 285-286 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
132. See, e.g., Johnson, 338 F.3d at 921-23; LaBare, 191 F.3d at 65; Birbal, 113 
F.3d at 345-46. 
133. United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1357 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Whether the 
principal exercises its control strictly, by targeting specific individuals, or casually, by 
loosing an informant on the prison population at large is irrelevant."), overruled on 
other grounds by Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Common­
wealth v. Murphy, 862 N.E.2d 30, 39 (Mass. 2007). Goodell argues that "either an 
agreement with the informant to provide information about fellow inmates or the 
targeting of a particular defendant is sufficient to show that the government is responsi­
ble for the informant's questioning ...." Goodell, supra note 115, at 2531. 
134. See supra notes 106-127 and accompanying text. 
135. Goodell asserts that "[o]nce an informant becomes a state agent, pursuant to 
an agreement to collect information, her actions weigh in on the government side­
particularly in the case of the informant at large."Goodell, supra note 115, at 2538-39. 
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tion should be obtained.136 For instance, in United States v. Birbal, 
the state entered into a plea agreement with an informant, 
Gabaree, who was to provide "any and all information in his pos­
session relating directly or indirectly to any and all criminal activi­
ties or other matters of which he has knowledge."137 The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that in the ab­
sence of a provision in the agreement to provide information about 
Birbal specifically, Gabaree was not acting as a state agent but as an 
independent entrepreneur when he elicited incriminating state­
ments from the accused.138 
The Second Circuit's decision in Birbal stands in stark contrast 
to the decisions reached by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Sampol139 and the Massachu­
setts Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Murphy.1 40 In 
both Sampol and Murphy, law enforcement officials entered into 
written plea agreements with informants who would provide in­
criminating information about other inmates.141 Although these 
agreements did not name the specific individuals to be targeted, 
both courts held that the informants were state agents whose elici­
tations of incriminating statements amounted to Sixth Amendment 
violations.142 The Murphy court expressly determined that a target­
ing requirement was unnecessary under the Supreme Court's 
precedents.143 
Murphy and Sampol are consonant with the protective nature 
of the Sixth Amendment as well as the Henry decision. Informants­
at-large are clearly motivated to obtain incriminating information 
and do not require police to instruct them to inform on a particular 
subject. Jails are filled with individuals awaiting trial who are vul­
nerable to informants seeking to elicit information from them that 
136. See, e.g., Birbat, 113 F.3d 342. 
137. Id. at 344 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
138. Id. at 346. 
139. United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
140. Commonwealth v. Murphy, 862 N.E.2d 30 (Mass. 2007). 
141. Sampot, 636 F.2d at 632-34; Murphy, 862 N.E.2d at 34. 
142. Sampot, 636 F.2d at 636-38; Murphy, 862 N.E.2d at 46. Murphy was signifi­
cant because, although the agreement was with federal agents, the information was used 
by state prosecutors. See Murphy, 862 N.E.2d at 35. On appeal, the Commonwealth 
argued that because the informant's agreement was with the federal government, he 
was not an agent of the Commonwealth. Id. The court's holding is an important elabo­
ration of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence in that an agency relationship between an 
informant and federal government authorities can be imputed to state authorities, and, 
presumably, vice versa. See id. 
143. Murphy, 862 N.E. 2d at 39. 
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can be used at trial. In order to properly protect inmates from the 
state's circumvention of their Sixth Amendment rights, all jurisdic­
tions in the United States should find an agency relationship where 
law enforcement officials form agreements with their agents, writ­
ten or otherwise, without specifying a specific accused. 
Some prosecutors and police officers develop significant rela­
tionships with jailhouse informants where the latter are regularly 
rewarded for providing incriminating information about other in­
mates, even in the absence of any formal agreement identifying a 
targeted defendant.144 In United States v. Johnson, the prosecutor 
made a concerted effort to place a notorious defendant in the same 
detention facility with his prized informant, McNeese, with the spe­
cific intent that McNeese would elicit incriminating statements from 
her.145 The prosecutor never communicated to McNeese that he 
wanted information about Johnson.146 Nevertheless, just as ex­
pected, McNeese established a friendly rapport with Johnson and 
was able to garner her trust, leading to her making incriminating 
statements to him.147 The Eighth Circuit, viewing the factual tab­
leau narrowly, determined that there was no state agency relation­
ship, and thus no Sixth Amendment violation.148 
Juxtaposed against the holding in Johnson is the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania's decision in Commonwealth v. Moose. 149 In 
Moose, the district attorney established an ongoing relationship 
with an informant named Oglesby who had been incarcerated in a 
county jail for three years while awaiting sentencing.150 The Com­
monwealth delayed sentencing each time Oglesby produced a new 
confession.151 Although the district attorney never gave Oglesby 
144. Goodell states: "When government officials encourage an inmate to collect 
information from jailmates, they deputize an informant at large, commissioning him to 
gather information from those the government is forbidden by the Sixth Amendment to 
question out of the presence of counsel." Goodell, supra note 115, at 2538. 
145. United States v. Johnson, 338 F.3d 918, 919-20 (8th Cir. 2003). 
146. /d. at 92l. 
147. Id. at 919-20. 
148. /d. at 919. Daniel Kirsch notes that the Johnson decision 
severely limits a defendant's protections against the government's intentional 
use of implicit, or "wink and nod," agreements with undercover informants to 
circumvent the right to counsel. Although the court's decision may further the 
interests of effective law enforcement, the resulting sacrifice of fair play in the 
adversarial justice system is too costly for society to bear. 
Daniel Kirsch, The Prosecutor Circumvents the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel with 
a Simple "Wink and Nod", 69 Mo. L. REv. 553,553 (2004). 
149. Commonwealth v. Moose, 602 A.2d 1265 (Pa. 1992). 
150. /d. at 1270. 
151. /d. 
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specific instructions to procure incriminating information, the court 
determined that Oglesby knew that he had to procure such confes­
sions while in jail in order to get a good recommendation at his 
sentencing.152 Determining that this arrangement created a princi­
pal-agent relationship, the court stated: 
[i]t is not significant that Oglesby was not planted for the purpose 
of gaining information from a targeted defendant. The fact that 
the Commonwealth intentionally left him there to harvest infor­
mation from anyone charged with a crime and awaiting trial is 
the villainy. The vast majority of people in county jail are 
charged with crimes and awaiting trial and they have a right to 
counsel when interrogated about the crimes with which they are 
charged.153 
The Moose decision represents an important position in favor 
of closing a major loophole left open by the United States Supreme 
Court. The Court's failure to provide clear guiding principles on 
the determination of state agency has created tensions among vari­
ous courts throughout the United States applying the Sixth 
Amendment. 
To date, the Supreme Court of Canada has not addressed the 
issue of whether the state must specifically identify the accused.154 
Yet the absence of a targeting requirement has not created anything 
that resembles the disparate approaches in United States courts. To 
recall, the Supreme Court of Canada's legal test for determining 
state agency under s. 7 focuses on the material impact of the state's 
intervention on the exchange between the accused and the inform­
ant.155 This analysis leaves open the question whether the state's 
intervention can "materially impact" an exchange if the state agent 
is not even made aware that the state wants to obtain information 
from a sI?ecific accused. 
Furthermore, the facts of Hebert, Broyles, and Liew seem to 
imply that a specific targeting requirement is called for to deter­
152. [d. 
153. [d. 
154. It is notable that in a pre-Broyles decision, R. v. Gray, the Ontario Court of 
Appeal held that an informant who worked for the police on other matters was not a 
state agent when he elicited incriminating statements without explicit instructions. See 
R. v. Gray, 4 O.R.3d 33, 'lI'l1 33-35 (Ont. c.A. 1991) (Can.), available at 1991 Carswell 
Ont 691 (Westlaw). However Broyles, which was decided after Gray, provided more 
expansive coverage of what constitutes a "police agent." See Tanovich, supra note 54, 
at 27-28 (discussing the Gray decision and the Broyles factors). 
155. See supra notes 101-108 and accompanying text. 
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mine state agency.156 In Hebert and Liew, the state agents were 
both undercover police officers and there was no question of their 
status as agents of the state, nor was there any question that the 
officers were seeking to acquire information from the identified de­
fendants.157 Undercover police officers are not likely to be sent 
into the jailhouse environment as agents-at-Iarge, but are sent in to 
acquire information about specific individuals. In Broyles, the state 
agent, Ritter, who was the accused's friend, was explicitly requested 
by the authorities to provide them with any incriminating state­
ments made by Broyles.15s 
However, there is also language in Broyles which suggests that 
a specific targeting requirement may not be required. The Broyles 
Court noted, there may be circumstances where the state makes it 
known to a jailhouse informant that it will reward the informant for 
acquiring incriminating information about others within the jail­
house context and that such actions may constitute a material inter­
vention.159 The test in such circumstances is "would the exchange 
between the informer and the accused have taken place but for the 
inducements of the authorities?"160 It is feasible in such contexts 
that law enforcement officials may suggest to a potential informant 
that they are interested in receiving information generally about 
others but not specify a particular accused. In such circumstances, 
it would be consistent with a purposive approach to s. 7 to protect 
the interests of vulnerable defendants, despite the absence of any 
specific targeting by the state. 
A requirement that state agents be instructed to obtain incrim­
inating statements from a specific accused, however, may, for the 
most part, be a moot issue in Canadian Charter jurisprudence. 
Among the many cell-plant interrogation cases, at least since the 
time Hebert was decided, a large number have involved the use of 
undercover police officers as state agents.161 The specific targeting 
156. R. v. Liew, [1999] 3 s.c.R. 227 (Can. 1999), available at 1999 CarswellAlta 
821 (Westlaw); R v. Broyles, [1991]3 S.c.R. 595 (Can. 1991), available at 1991 Carswel­
lAlta 212 (Westlaw); R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.c.R. 151 (Can. 1990), available at 1990 
CarswellYukon 7 (Westlaw). 
157. Liew, [1999] 2 S.c.R. 227, <J[ 7; Hebert, [1990] 2 S.c.R. 151, <J[ 53. 
158. Broyles, [1991] 3 S.c.R. 595, <J[ 41. 
159. Id. n 30-32. 
160. Id. <J[ 32. 
161. See, e.g., Liew, [1999] 3 S.c.R. 227; R. v. Brown, [1993] 2 S.c.R. 918 (Can. 
1993), available at 1993 CarswellAlta 412 (Westlaw); Hebert, [1990] 2 S.c.R. 151; R. v. 
Spanevello, 51 B.C.L.R.3d 192 (B.C.C.A. 1998) (Can.), available at 1998 CarswellBC 
1129 (Westlaw); R. v. Bell, 92 B.C.A.C. 275 (B.C.C.A. 1997) (Can.), available at 1997 
CarswellBC 1384 (Westlaw); R. v. Kiloh, 2003 B.C.S.c. 209 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 2003) (Can.), 
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requirement is germane to the context of jailhouse informants who 
elicit information. However, it does not arise when the state agents 
are police officers. Where undercover police officers have conver­
sations with suspects in custody, the Broyles Court expressly stated, 
"it is clear that the conversation" between the accused and the un­
dercover police officer "would not have taken place but for the in­
tervention of the officer."162 
Given the onerous challenges that an accused must face in or­
der to demonstrate "active elicitation" under Broyles, it appears 
that Canadian law enforcement agencies have been willing, in many 
instances, to forego any potential challenges to state agency by their 
frequent use of undercover police officers. Conversely, given the 
more flexible nature of the deliberate elicitation standard in the 
United States, law enforcement officers have taken advantage of 
the unclear parameters set by the United States Supreme Court in 
determining state agency. In several United States jurisdictions, of­
ficers have effectively managed to circumvent an accused's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel by employing jailhouse informants.163 
IV. ELICITATION 
The second key element that an American or Canadian defen­
dant must prove in order to show that the state violated her consti­
tutional rights through a cell-plant interrogation is that its agent 
elicited the incriminating statements. In the United States, the elici­
tation must be "deliberate," indicating intentional conduct.164 
Under Canadian law, the state agent must "actively" elicit the in-
available at 2003 CarswellBC 326 (Westlaw); R. v. Ertmoed, 2002 B.C.S.C. 806 (B.C. 
Sup. Ct. 2002) (Can.), available at 2002 CarswellBC 3701 (Westlaw); R. v. Pritchard, 
2002 B.C.S.C. 453 (B.c. Sup. Ct. 2002) (Can.), available at 2002 CarswellBC 3532 
(Westlaw); R. v. Van Osselaer, 2000 B.C.S.C. 1065 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 2000) (Can.), available 
at 2000 CarswellBC 2648 (Westlaw); R. v. Skinner, 84 Man. R.2d 223 (Man. Q. B. 1992) 
(Can.), available at 1992 CarswellMan 157 (Westlaw); R. v. Jackson, 51 0.A.c. 92 (Ont. 
c.A. 1991) (Can.), available at 1991 CarswellOnt 119 (Westlaw); R. v. Graham, 1 
0.R.3d 499 (Ont. c.A. 1991) (Can.), available at 1991 CarswellOnt 77 (Westlaw); R. v. 
Jenkins, Chatham 2049/00, 2000 WL 31978665 (Ont. S.c.J. 2002) (Can.), available at 
2002 CatswellOnt 6175 (Westlaw); R. v. Moulton, [1999] O.J. No. 661 (Ont. C.J. Gen. 
Div. 1999) (Can.), available at 1999 CarswellOnt 593 (Westlaw); R. c. Caron, Laval 540­
01-16962-022 (Que. Sup. Ct. 2004) (Can.), available at 2004 Carswell Que 7529 
(Westlaw). 
162. Broyles, [1991] 3 S.c.R. 595, 'II 31. 
163. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 338 F.3d 918, 919-20 (8th Cir. 2003); see 
also supra notes 145-147 and accompanying text. 
164. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270 (1980); Massiah v. United 
States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). 
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criminating statements, implying both intentionality and perhaps 
substantial or vigorous conduct.165 As this section will demon­
strate, the United States juridical approach to deliberate elicitation 
is more flexible than its approach to state agency, allowing for less 
active forms of eliciting conduct.166 Conversely, while the Supreme 
Court of Canada articulated more generous factors to determining 
state agency, it has placed more significant hurdles in the way of the 
accused to prove that the incriminating statement was actively elic­
ited.167 In determining "active" elicitation, Canadian courts look 
specifically to both the nature of the exchange and the nature of the 
relationship between the accused and the state agent.168 
A. Nature of the Exchange 
1. Language of the Legal Tests 
The United States Supreme Court has held that a "defendant 
must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some 
action, beyond merely listening, that was deSIgned deliberately to 
elicit incriminating remarks. "169 While the test recognizes an ac­
tive/passive distinction and requires the state agent to cross the con­
stitutional threshold· by engaging in some action, it does not require 
that the conduct rise to the level of a formal interrogation or its 
functional equivalent.170 Furthermore, the test not only looks at 
the conduct of the state agent, but also the conduct of the police (in 
perhaps arranging for the elicitation to take place).l71 This would 
seem to require courts to examine the totality of the state's conduct. 
By contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada assesses the nature 
of the exchange between the accused and the state agent with refer­
ence to the following factors from Broyles: "[d]id the state agent 
actively seek out information such that the exchange could be char­
acterized as akin to an interrogation, or did he or she conduct his or 
her part of the conversation as someone in the role the accused 
believed the informer to be playing would ordinarily have 
165. See, e.g., Broyles, [1991]3 s.c.R. 595, 'II 35. 
166. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
167. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
168. See, e.g., Broyles, [1991] 3 S.c.R. 595. 
169. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 458 (1986). 
170. See Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 524-25 (2004). The distinction 
between deliberate elicitation and interrogation, however, has not always been clear. 
See James J. Tomkovicz, Reaffirming the Right to Pretrial Assistance: The Surprising 
Little Case o/Fellers v. United States, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 501, 509-30 (2006). 
171. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 458 (holding that the defendant must show that 
"the police ... took some action"). 
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done?"l72 The language of this test dearly stresses greater activity 
on the part of the state agent that calls, in effect, for the accused to 
demonstrate that the agent took significant action to procure the 
impugned statements. Also, these Broyles factors myopically focus 
on the conduct of the state agent, but do not look at the overall 
actions of both the state and its agent. 
2. United States Jurisprudence 
Although the concept of deliberate elicitation has been applied 
in the Sixth Amendment context since the United States Supreme 
Court's 1964 decision in Massiah, the Court defined deliberate elici­
tation for the first time in Kuhlmann v. Wilson in 1986.173 In Mas­
siah, the Court described the exchange between Massiah and 
Colson, the state's agent, as a "conversation" but never mentioned 
what specific statements Colson may have made to elicit the incul­
patory statements from Massiah.174 The Henry Court similarly did 
not define elicitation.175 Factually, there was no indication as to 
what the informant actually said to elicit Henry's incriminating re­
marks or who initiated the conversations that led to the statements 
being made.176 Fundamentally, Henry focused on whether the state 
"intentionally creat[ed] a situation likely to induce Henry to make 
incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel."l77 Fur­
thermore, the Court observed that "confinement may bring into 
play subtle influences that will make him particularly susceptible to 
the ploys of undercover Government agents."178 Thus, "the incrim­
inating conversations between Henry and Nichols were facilitated 
172. Broyles, [1991] 3 S.c.R. 595, 'lI 38. 
173. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 458. 
174. Colson was actually arrested with Massiah for the trafficking of narcotics. 
Prior to their conversation, which took place in Colson'S car, Colson brokered a deal 
with the state where he would plead guilty and assist in acquiring incriminating state­
ments from Massiah. See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 202-03. 
175. See generally United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980). 
176. Justice Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion, wrote: 

We know nothing about the nature of these conversations, particularly 

whether Nichols subtly or otherwise focused attention on the bank robberies. 

Indeed, to the extent the record says anything at all, it supports the inference 

that it was Henry, not Nichols, who "engaged" the other "in some conversa­

tions," and who was the moving force behind any mention of the crime. 

Id. at 288 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also White, Interrogation Without Questions, 
supra note 41, at 1219. 
177. Henry, 447 U.S. at 274 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
178. Id. 
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by Nichols' conduct and apparent status as a person sharing a com­
mon plight. "179 
As with state agency, United States courts were left to deter­
mine the meaning of deliberate elicitation from the facts of Henry 
and other Sixth Amendment cases.180 Yet, despite the lack of a pre­
cise definition, Henry's factual context made clear that the Court 
was more interested in the mere fact that the state agent engaged in 
conversation that resulted in the utterance of incriminating state­
ments than whether the agent actively pursued the elicitation. 
Thus, it was unnecessary to examine the content of the state agent's 
statements. 
In Kuhlmann, the Supreme Court articulated its deliberate 
elicitation test: a "defendant must demonstrate that the police and 
their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was 
designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks. "181 The 
phrasing of this test naturally leaves open what and how much ac­
tion is actually required beyond mere listening; this is to be under­
stood within the factual circumstances of each case. In Kuhlmann, 
the accused, Wilson, was arraigned for robbery and murder, which 
took place at a taxi depot where he worked.182 Wilson was con­
fined in a jail cell with an informant named Lee, who had a prior 
arrangement with the state to report any statements made by Wil­
son, particularly the names of Wilson's accomplices to the crimes.183 
Adding to Wilson's anxieties, and ultimately helping prompt him to 
speak, was his placement in a jail cell that overlooked the actual 
179. Id. 
180. The Court dealt with the issue of "deliberate elicitation" in a Sixth Amend­
ment case decided a few years prior to Henry, though not in a case involving an under­
cover police agent. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). In Brewer, two police 
officers transported an individual suspected of murdering a ten-year-old girl from one 
city to another. Id. at 393. One of the police officers accompanying the suspect (and 
after the latter's Sixth Amendment rights attached) appealed to the suspect's Christian 
sensibilities to reveal the location of the girl's body. /d. Without asking the suspect any 
questions, the police officer created a vivid image of the body of the girl he was sus­
pected of killing being buried by a snowstorm and her parents holding a burial with no 
body. ld. The Court determined that the officer's monologue violated the suspect's 
right to counsel and analogized the officer's deliberate elicitation to an interrogation. 
ld. at 399. It held that the police officer "deliberately and designedly set out to elicit 
information from Williams just as surely as-and perhaps more effectively than-if he 
had formally interrogated him." Id. An understanding of the definition emerges from 
the facts of the case, but like Henry, decided a few years later, no factors were articu­
lated. For an insightful discussion on the Brewer decision, see Kamisar, supra note 72. 
181. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986). 
182. Id. at 439. 
183. ld. 
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crime scene.184 Wilson began to speak "to Lee about the robbery, 
narrating the same story that he had given the police at the time of 
his arrest."185 Lee advised Wilson that the latter's story "didn't 
sound too good."186 In a footnote, the Court related a different 
account of this conversation, observing that during the trial, Lee 
had said more to Wilson than the Court suggested in the main text 
of its decision.187 The footnote stated: "[a]t the suppression hear­
ing, Lee testified that, after hearing respondent's initial version of 
his participation in the crimes, 'I think I remember telling him that 
the story wasn't-it didn't sound too good. Things didn't look too 
good for him.' "188 When Lee testified at trial, he recalled yet an­
other variation of his original remark, stating, "Well, I said, look, 
you better come up with a better story than that because that one 
doesn't sound too cool to me, that's what I said."189 This narration 
demonstrates that Lee's statements seemed to be somewhat more 
extensive than what the Court recounted, and thus it is curious why 
it limited Lee's testimony to the abbreviated "didn't sound too 
goOd."190 
In the days following this conversation, Wilson allegedly began 
to change his story. However, the Court's record does not describe 
the nature of conversations between Wilson and Lee during that 
period.191 Wilson received a visit from his brother informing him 
that family members were upset because they believed Wilson mur­
dered the taxi dispatcher.192 Emotionally impacted by this meeting, 
Wilson supposedly revealed his crime to Lee, who surreptitiously 
took notes and conveyed them to the authorities.193 Wilson's in­
criminating statements were then admitted into evidence, and he 
was convicted.194 
184. It is not clear whether the police placed Wilson in that cell intentionally to 
increase his anxiety or whether it was merely coincidental. However, given that the 
police placed an agent in the cell to obtain incriminating statements, it seems unlikely 
that the placement was unintentional. Interestingly, the Court found this fact insignifi­
cant and ignored it as mere coincidence. [d. at 460 n.24. 
185. [d. at 439. 
186. [d. at 439-40 (internal quotation marks omitted). See generally Peter 
Brooks, Narrative Transactions-Does the Law Need a Narratology?, 18 J.L. & HUMAN. 
1 (2006). 




191. [d. at 440. 
192. [d. 
193. [d. 
194. [d. at 441. 
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The Supreme Court held that Wilson's right to counsel was not 
violated under the circumstances of the case, asserting that his com­
ments were "spontaneous" and "unsolicited," notwithstanding 
Lee's remark that the story "didn't sound too good."195 The Court 
simply refused to consider the other versions of Lee's account for 
the purposes of the deliberate elicitation test. Its articulation of de­
liberate elicitation being "some action, beyond merely listening, 
that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks" was 
tainted by the Court's misapplication of the test to the facts of 
Kuhlrnann.196 Clearly Lee, by his own testimony, took action be­
yond mere listening that was designed to elicit incriminating state­
ments, notwithstanding the instructions he was given just to 
listen.197 His actions were likely to induce the utterance of an in­
criminating response. The Court should have properly character­
ized Lee's response as sufficient for a violation of the elicitation 
test, and its decision evidences that the active/passive distinction 
could lead to problematic results.198 Moreover, the Court's narra­
tion of the facts was faulty not solely for its willful blindness to 
Lee's testimonial acknowledgment of what he said to Wilson. It 
was compounded by its failure to consider the likelihood that over 
the course of a few days of shared confinement, this would not be 
the only thing that Lee said to induce Wilson to reveal incriminat­
ing information about his crime.199 As Justice Brennan astutely ob­
served in his dissenting opinion, a Sixth Amendment analysis 
195. Id. at 460. 
196. See id. at 459. 
197. Recall that in Henry, Nichols was also instructed just to listen, but failed to 
follow the instructions. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 271 (1980) ("The 
Government argues that the federal agents instructed Nichols not to question Henry 
about the robbery."). The Court also held that the state controls the agent and cannot 
benefit from the agent's disobedience. Id. at 271-74. 
198. The Court's emphasis on the active/passive character of the elicitation cre­
ates certain analytical problems. In order to determine whether a state agent actively 
elicited incriminating statements or was a passive listener, courts, absent any recordings, 
must rely upon the self-serving testimony of the informant and the accused. See April 
Leigh Ammeter, Kuhlmann v. Wilson: "Passive" and "Active" Government Infor­
mants-A Problematic Test, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1423, 1435-36 (1987); Matthew J. Merritt, 
Jailhouse Informants and the Sixth Amendment: Is the U.S. Supreme Court Adequately 
Protecting An Accused's Right to Counsel?, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1348-49 (2003). 
199. Justice Brennan also notes in his dissent: "Lee encouraged [Wilson] to talk 
about his crime by conversing with him on the subject over the course of several days 
and by telling [Wilson] that his exculpatory story would not convince anyone without 
more work." Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 475 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is unclear whether 
this was something that Justice Brennan inferred or was based upon some fact stated in 
the parties' submissions. 
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required a more complete review of "the entire course of govern­
ment" conduct.2°O 
However, a recent Sixth Amendment case may be signaling a 
shift towards a broader understanding of deliberate elicitation. In 
Fellers v. United States, two non-undercover police officers went to 
the accused's home to arrest him.201 Fellers invited the two officers 
into his house.202 After the officers entered, they advised him that 
they had a federal warrant for his arrest following a grand jury's 
indictment for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamines.203 The 
officers advised Fellers that the indictment named four other indi­
viduals.204 Unprompted by the officers, Fellers admitted to know­
ing the four individuals and to using methamphetamines during his 
association with them.20s 
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the officers deliber­
ately elicited Fellers's remarks in violation of his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel, given that he was indicted at the time of the en­
counter.206 By informing the accused of the charges and the names 
of the others indicted, the officers conduct went beyond mere lis­
tening, thus deliberately eliciting the incriminating statements. Yet, 
in light of the outcome in Kuhlmann, the conduct of the Fellers po­
lice officers does not appear to rise to the level of sufficiently active 
conduct. The Fellers case, through its facts, has perhaps restored a 
broader interpretation of "deliberate elicitation," one that requires 
less action to satisfy the deliberate elicitation test. 
3. Canadian Jurisprudence 
Juxtaposed against these United States Supreme Court inter­
pretations of elicitation are those advanced by the Supreme Court 
of Canada. The latter's first application of the s. 7 right to silence to 
cell-plant interrogation was in R. v. Hebert.207 In Hebert, the ac­
cused was arrested for robbery.208 After being advised of his right 
to counsel and consulting with a lawyer, Hebert refused to make a 
200. [d. at 476. 





206. [d. at 524-25. 
207. R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 (Can. 1990), available at 1990 Carswell 
Yukon 7 (Westlaw). 
208. [d. 'lI 13. 
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statement and was placed in a jail cell.209 The authorities placed an 
undercover police officer in the cell with Hebert, who successfully 
elicited incriminating statements from him.210 The Court arrived at 
the conclusion that Hebert's right to silence was violated without 
reviewing a specific transcript of the exchange.211 This may indicate 
that the Court purposely sought to produce a broad interpretation 
of elicitation. 
In R. v. Broyles, decided the following year, the Court held 
that the exchange between the accused and the state's agent (the 
accused's friend), Ritter, was the functional equivalent of an inter­
rogation and that Ritter directed the conversation to areas where 
the state wanted information and did not allow the conversation to 
"flow naturally."212 During the course of their exchanges, Ritter 
made statements disparaging Broyles's counsel, which the Court as­
serted undermined Broyles's right to counsel,213 
Broyles contributed to the case law on cell-plant interrogations 
by providing a more developed factual context by way of transcripts 
of the Broyles-Ritter conversation.214 Subsequent courts could 
look to the transcribed dialogue in Broyles and gauge the degree of 
"active" elicitation required to find a violation of s. 7 in cases 
before them. However, while providing a factual context, Broyles 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. A review of some of the immediate post-Hebert cases suggests that some 
lower courts were not prepared to view the absence of a transcript as an invitation to 
perceive elicitation in a more flexible manner. See, e.g., R. v. Gray, (1991) 4 O.R. (3d) 
33, available at 1991 CarswellOnt 691 (Westlaw); R. v. Graham, (1991) 1 O.R. (3d) 499, 
available at 1991 CarswellOnt 77 (Westlaw). 
212. R. v. Broyles, [1991] 3 S.c.R. 595, 'lI 42 (Can. 1991), available at 1991 Car­
swellAlta 212 (Westlaw). The following excerpt of a conversation that occurred be­
tween the accused and the informant demonstrates the court's findings: 
BROYLES: Like I, I already said stuff and whatnot. There's really no more that 

I can say. 

RIITER: You could admit to them that you killed her. 

BROYLES: But I didn't. 














213.' Id. n 43-44 ("The right to counsel would indeed be meaningless if the au­
thorities were entitled to undermine the confidence of the accused in his counsel in 
order to extract a confession."). 
214. Id. <JI 42. 
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also set an onerous standard for an accused to prove active elicita­
tion by suggesting that an agent must issue a series of probing ques­
tions-akin to an interrogation or its functional equivalent-in 
order for the nature-of-the-exchange factors to be met.215 The fol­
lowing two cases illustrate that a state agent's questioning need not 
be as "active" as Ritter's questioning in Broyles, yet could be just as 
effective given an accused's ignorance of the fact that he is speaking 
to an undercover state agent and the coercive impact of the deten­
tion environment where the questioning takes place. 
Some years after his first brush with cell-plant interrogations, 
which brought his case to the Supreme Court of Canada, Broyles 
was once again arrested, this time for the murder of his common­
law spouse.216 While in detention pending trial, a jailhouse inform­
ant who had no previous relationship with Broyles developed a 
friendship with him over the course of thirteen days.217 During that 
period, the informant gave Broyles cigarettes and protected him 
when he was attacked by other inmates.218 Following an emotional 
visit by his mother and his pastor, Broyles sought out his new jail­
house friend to vent his angst.219 Seeing Broyles upset, the inform­
ant grabbed two juice bottles and both he and Broyles went into a 
corner to talk.220 The informant then asked, "What's the mat­
ter?"221 Broyles replied that "he wished that he never did what he 
did again."222 The informant asked, "What do you[] mean?" 
Broyles then replied, "I wish I never had strangled her, but the 
bitch was always fighting and nagging on me."223 Broyles's com­
215. The anxieties inherent to detention can make it so that such probing ques­
tions are unnecessary to elicit incriminating responses. See discussion supra notes 17-20 
and accompanying text. 
216. R. v. Broyles (Broyles 1/), 312 AR. 31, n 3-4 (Alta C.A. 1999) (Can.), avail­
able at 1999 CarswellAlta 341 (Westlaw). Broyles II, as used here, is not subsequent 
history to Broyles, but is referred to as such to distinguish the two cases. 
217. The informant was instructed to be a "potted plant," meaning that "he was 
not to interrogate the appellant." [d. <j[ 7. 
218. [d. 




223. [d. This was essentially the account of the exchange as told to the detective, 
who then provided this account as a witness. See id. This account, however, is different 
from the version that the informant relayed when he testified. The court stated that the 
informant claimed that after Broyles's mother visited, Broyles "felt really bad that he 
had let his mom down, that this had all happened, again. And it was at this point that 
he brought to my attention that he said he had strangled an individual." [d. The two 
accounts, while similar substantively, are markedly different when examining the over­
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ments were admitted into evidence by the trial court justice, and the 
Alberta Court of Appeal ultimately affirmed the trial court's deci­
sion that the responses were not elicited through the functional 
equivalent of an interrogation.224 
While it is clear that the informant merely asked Broyles what 
the latter meant when he said that "he wished that he never did 
what he did again," his question was clearly calculated and likely to 
elicit an incriminating response, particularly since it was coming 
from a trusted friend and jailhouse protector.225 Viewing the facts 
in context, the informant did not have to engage in a long series of 
questions to elicit information, for Broyles was already in a rather 
vulnerable state.226 Interrogations do not require lengthy interrog­
ative statements; even short and concise ones may lead to the re­
sponses that the interrogator is seeking to obtain. Furthermore, 
imagine in a similar scenario if a non-undercover police officer were 
to ask "what do you mean" to an individual like Broyles, who, in a 
guilt ridden state, had just uttered that he regretted what he had 
done. If the accused has not been informed either of his right to 
counselor silence, the courts should certainly construe the question 
as eliciting an incriminating statement. Just as non-undercover po­
lice officers do not have to engage in lengthy banter to elicit incrim­
inating statements, neither should undercover police officers. 
In 1999, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in R. v. 
Liew, which placed more significant hurdles in the way of an ac­
cused who is seeking to demonstrate a s. 7 violation.227 The case 
involved an undercover police officer, Jones, who elicited incrimi­
nating statements from the accused while they were in custody at 
all context and, moreover, the role of the informant in this dialogue who asked the 
accused questions to elicit the incriminating response. Id. Reading the informer's testi­
mony, one could certainly surmise that Broyles provided all the incriminating informa­
tion in an unsolicited manner. Absent as well from the informer's account is the fact 
that he took two drinks and went into the corner to talk about what was upsetting 
Broyles. Id. In so doing, the informer set up a private moment between friends that 
induced Broyles to admit his sorrow and guilt. Id. The informant's account also reveals 
the problems of relying on the testimony of an informant in the absence of a recording 
device. 
224. Id. 'll 17. The trial court found that the informant was not a state agent and 
thus did not engage in an analysis of the elicitation question. Id. 'll 13. The Court of 
Appeal determined that while the informant was a state agent, the statements procured 
were not the product of an active elicitation. See id. 'll'll 17-18. 
225. See id. 'll 16. 
226. See id. 
227. R. v. Liew, [1999] 3 S.c.R. 227 (Can. 1999), available at 1999 CarswellAlta 
821 (Westlaw). 
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the police station after their arrests during an undercover drug sting 
operation.228 Following the arrests, Jones continued to play his un­
dercover role and was transported in the same squad car with 
Liew.229 At the police station, Jones and Liew were placed in a 
room together where Liew initiated general conversation with 
Jones about the crime for which they were both arrested.230 Jones 
then shifted the conversation to a specific area of inquiry where­
upon Liew made incriminating statements.231 These were admitted 
into evidence, and Liew was convicted.232 
The Supreme Court held that Jones did not actively elicit 
Liew's incriminating statements.233 Focusing on the nature of the 
exchange, the Court asserted that when Jones asked "[w]hat hap­
pened?" and further stated "[t]hey got my fingerprints on the 
dope," he was merely following the "natural flow of the conversa­
228. [d. 'lI'Il 8-16. 
229. [d. 'lI'Il 10-11. 
230. [d. 'lI'l1 12-16. 
231. [d. 'lI 14. 
232. [d. 'lI'l1 17, 24. Their conversation is reproduced below with the italicized 
portions representing the contested portions that Liew sought to have excluded: 
ApPELLANT: That Lee is hot. 
JONES: What? 
ApPELLANT: That Lee is hot. 
JONES: Fuck. 
ApPELLANT: Did you pass the money? 
JONES: Fuck. The copS got it. 
ApPELLANT: How much? 
JONES: $48,000.00 
ApPELLANT: Ah, fuck. 
JONES: What happened? 
ApPELLANT: The cops watching us. 
JONES: Yeah. They got my fingerprints on the dope. 
ApPELLANT: Lee and me too. 
JONES: Why the fuck didn't you give it to me out of the black car? Why did 
you drive away? 
ApPELLANT: That the other guy. That not my dope. I just give it to Lee and 
drop him off. We very careful. 
JONES: The cops must have been following you guys. 
ApPELLANT: No we were very careful but Lee very hot. 
The appellant then asked about the $48,000 and the conversation continued: 
JONES: Fuck man, they're going to kill me for this man. 
ApPELLANT: Where are you from? 
JONES: From Slave Lake. 
ApPELLANT: Whose money? 
JONES: Indians from up there. Fuck man, my prints, Lee's prints and your 
prints are on the shit. 
ApPELLANT: Yeah. 
[d. 'lI'Il 14-15 (emphasis added). 
233. [d. 'lI'lI 47-51. 
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tion" initiated by the accused.234 Chief Justice Lamer, sitting as the 
sole dissenter, argued that Jones redirected the conversation from 
one about money, albeit initiated by the accused, to the issue of 
possession of narcotics, which resulted in his making the incriminat­
ing statement.235 Thus, according to the Chief Justice, Jones did not 
merely follow the "natural flow" of the conversation.236 Although 
Jones did not phrase his statement about the fingerprints as an in­
terrogative statement, it was nevertheless a comment intended to 
elicit an incriminating response.237 
The nature of the exchange factors first discussed in Broyles ,238 
and applied in Broyles II239 and Liew,240 demonstrate that an ac­
cused must show a significant degree of "active" conduct in order 
for courts to find that the agent elicited incriminating statements 
from the defendant. Unfortunately, unlike the United States Su­
preme Court, the Supreme Court of Canada has neglected to take 
into account the impact of the detention environment on an ac­
cused and how state agents may unfairly exploit such considerations 
to their advantage.241 Gordon Wall has argued that "[w]here a sus­
pect is confined in prison, a [more] contextualized approach [to 
elicitation] would take account of the impact of confinement by the 
state."242 Given the nature of the detention environment, the de­
gree of elicitation required to procure incriminating statements 
from incarcerated suspects pending trial should not need to rise to 
the level of a formal interrogation or its functional equivalent. 
The Supreme Court of Canada's understanding of cell-plant in­
terrogations and their functional equivalent needs to be revisited. 
234. Id. n 48-49. 
235. [d. n 3-5 (Lamer, c.J., dissenting). 
236. [d. 'll 5. 
237. [d. 
238. R. v. Broyles, [1991] 3 S.c.R. 595, n 37-39 (Can. 1991), available at 1991 
CarswellAlta 212 (Westlaw). 
239. See R. v. Broyles (Broyles II), 312 A.R. 31, n 14-18 (Alta C.A. 1999) 
(Can.), available at 1999 CarswellAlta 341 (WestIaw). 
240. See Liew, (1999] 3 S.C.R. 227, n 47-55. 
241. See R v. Hebert, [1990]2 S.c.R. 151, 'll'll12, 27 (Can. 1990), available at 1990 
CarswellYukon 7 (WestIaw) (Sopinka, J., concurring). 
242. Gordon Wall, The Pre-Trial Right to Silence in Canada and the United King­
dom 49 (Sept. 1995) (unpublished LLM thesis, Queen's University) (on file with the 
Western New England Law Review). Wall offered the following test for courts to con­
sider as part of the Broyles nature of the exchange of factors: "Considering all the 
circumstances of the exchange between the accused and the state agent, is there a 
causal link between the conduct of the state and/or its agents (including confining the 
accused in prison) and the making of the statement by the accused?" Id. at 50; see also 
Tanovich, supra note 54, at 31. 
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Although the Liew Court held that an "atmosphere of oppression" 
need not be present during a cell-plant interrogation in order for s. 
7 to be violated,243 the Broyles Court's reliance on the transcript of 
Ritter's interrogation of Broyles suggests that an interrogation 
should constitute a series of persistently asked questions (as in 
Broyles) that may fall short of "oppression."244 In a normal inter­
rogation environment, an accused is aware that she is speaking with 
police officers, and she may exert a significant degree of resistance 
that a police officer conducting the interrogation will have to 
overcome. 
In contrast, in a cell-plant interrogation, the accused's igno­
rance of the fact that she is speaking with a state agent will likely 
induce her to drop her guard, thus making it unnecessary to pursue 
the type of active interrogation questioning to which Ritter sub­
jected Broyles.245 According to a significant police interrogation 
manual, a "principal psychological factor contributing to a success­
ful interrogation is privacy" and the absence of any "usual police 
surroundings" that will remind the accused that she is in an interro­
gation room.246 Furthermore, law enforcement officers are advised 
to give the impression that they are merely seeking the truth; they 
are not investigators seeking a conviction.247 A cell-plant interroga­
tion includes all of these elements, which is why law enforcement 
agents favor their use. When the object of the exchange is to elicit 
incriminating statements, regardless of the form, the substance re­
mains the same-interrogation. 
B. Nature of the Relationship 
All actions taken in life are understood within a particular fac­
tual (and cultural) context and it is this context that helps to shape 
and give actions their meaning. The relationship between an ac­
cused and the state agent can have an impact on the manner in 
which statements are elicited. For example, subtle remarks may 
elicit an incriminating statement between two close friends al­
though similar remarks may not evoke the same response in an­
other context. In some traditional custodian interrogations, police 
243. See Liew, [1999] 3 S.C.R 227, 'Il 37. 
244. See Broyles, [1991] 3 S.c.R. 595, 'Il 42. 
245. [d. 
246. FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFES­
SIONS 1, 7 (1962). 
247. [d. at 13. 
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officers will attempt to befriend an accused.248 If the police officer 
is significantly older than the accused, the officer may foster a ma­
ternal or paternal relationship to elicit an incriminating response.249 
Therefore, just as environmental factors such as the detention con­
text need to be considered, so too should the relationship of the 
agent and the accused have some bearing on interpreting the im­
pact of the conduct that results in the utterance of the incriminating 
responses. 
While the United States Supreme Court in Henry considered 
how confinement may impact the elicitation of incriminating state­
ments in the detention context (although it seemed to have ignored 
it altogether in Kuhlmann), it has not mandated an analysis of the 
nature of the relationship between the state agent and the accused 
or how that relationship may have impacted the elicitation.250 In 
Kulhmann, the informant, Lee, spent a few days in the cell with the 
accused, Wilson, and although a relationship of trust may have de­
veloped, it was of no moment to the Court when it held that Lee 
did not elicit Wilson's incriminating statements. However, in his 
dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan observed, "[t]he informant, 
while avoiding direct questions, nonetheless developed a relation­
ship of cellmate camaraderie with respondent and encouraged him 
to talk about his crime."251 Yet the Court chose to ignore this rela­
tionship in its analysis, including how that relationship may have 
248. See White, Police Trickery, supra note 26, at 615 n.243. 
249. See State v. Woods, 345 N.W.2d 457, 472 (Wis. 1984); see also White, Police 
Trickery, supra note 26, at 615. 
250. In two decisions prior to Kuhlmann, however, there are hints that suggest 
that the relationship between the state agent and the accused may have been of some 
consideration to the Court. For instance, when the Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth 
Circuit's decision in Henry, it specifically noted the lower court's observation that 
whether "by association, by general conversation, or both, [the informant] had devel­
oped a relationship of trust and confidence with Henry such that Henry revealed in­
criminating information." United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 269 (1980). Such 
interference amounted to a violation of Henry's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. 
However, it did not further address the issue in its own opinion. Subsequently, in 
Maine v. Moulton, a case where the state's informant, Colson, was the co-defendant in a 
criminal prosecution involving the accused, the Court held that Colson elicited incrimi­
nating statements from Moulton. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985). In a foot­
note, the Court observed that Colson and Moulton's relationship as co-defendants 
could impact upon the elicitation. It stated: "Because Moulton thought of Colson only 
as his co-defendant, Colson'S engaging Moulton in active conversation about their up­
coming trial was certain to elicit statements that Moulton would not intentionally re­
veal-and had a constitutional right not to reveal-to persons known to be police 
agents." Id. at 176 n.13. 
251. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 476 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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impacted the actions Lee took to elicit the incriminating statements 
from Wilson. 
In contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada expressly examines 
the "nature of the relationship" between the accused and the state 
agent to identify whether the agent has exploited a relationship of 
trust between the twO.252 As articulated in Broyles, a court must 
ask: 
Did the state agent exploit any special characteristics of the rela­
tionship to extract the statement? Was there a relationship of 
trust between the state agent and the accused? Was the accused 
obligated or vulnerable to the state agent? Did the state agent 
manipulate the accused to bring about a mental state in which 
the accused was more likely to talk?253 
These factors, emphasizing a relationship of trust between the 
defendant and the state agent, fail to specifically address how such 
relationships critically impact the actual exchange and may produce 
incriminating information. These factors also suggest that an ac­
cused must demonstrate that the state agent has used a pre-existing 
or developed relationship of trust to extract incriminating state­
ments. In Broyles, the Court determined that Ritter used his pre­
existing relationship of trust with the accused to manipulate the lat­
ter into eventually inculpating himself.254 
A relationship of trust can be a crucial (and perhaps disposi­
tive) factor in determining the existence of a violation of s. 7. For 
instance, in R. v. Jackson an undercover female police officer, 
Slack, developed a relationship of trust with the accused, who was 
incarcerated pending trial.255 Posing as a student interested in the 
judicial system, Slack attended Jackson's preliminary enquiry and 
was instructed to develop a relationship with the spouse of Jack­
son's co-accused.256 Jackson expressed interest in Slack, who was 
later instructed by her superiors to visit Jackson in jail and maintain 
her cover as a student.257 Slack visited Jackson six times over the 
course of six months, with each session lasting sixty to ninety min­
utes in duration, supplemented with numerous exchanges of corre­
252. See, e.g., R v. Broyles, [1991] 3 S.c.R. 595 (Can. 1991), available at 1991 
Carswell Alta 212 (Westlaw). 
253. Id. 'lI 39. 
254. Id. 'lI 43. 
255. R. v. Jackson, 51 O.A.c. 92, 'lI 45 (Ont. c.A. 1991) (Can.), available at 1991 
CarswellOnt 119 (Westlaw). 
256. Id. 'lI 3l. 
257. Id. 'lI 32. 
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spondence during that period.258 When Jackson expressed a sexual 
interest in Slack, she did nothing to dissuade him.259 Although 
most of their conversations were unrelated to Jackson's alleged 
crime, Slack was able eventually to elicit incriminating statements 
from Jackson through their developed relationship of trust, which 
was used to convict him.260 The Ontario Court of Appeal held that 
Jackson's right to silence was infringed and the evidence should 
have been excluded under s. 24(2).261 It determined that Slack nur­
tured a relationship of trust with Jackson and noted the "strong sex­
ual overtones" that imbued the relationship, particularly from 
Jackson's perspective.262 The court viewed this as "a strong invita­
tion to Jackson to impart confidential matters to her in order to 
buttress that relationship."263 
Jackson does not mandate that the accused and the informant 
interact for six months before a trust relationship can be developed. 
R. v. Brown suggests that this relationship can be established within 
a shorter, yet more concentrated time frame. 264 In Brown, an un­
dercover police officer, Jones, was housed in the same cell with the 
accused for at least a thirty-hour period.265 Despite having no pre­
existing relationship, Jones developed a relationship of trust by por­
traying himself as an experienced criminal who had beaten "the 
rap" himself.266 Posing as a fellow criminal, Jones made Brown be­
lieve that he had friends outside who could silence witnesses, hide 
evidence, or take the fall on Brown's behalf for an appropriate 
fee.267 Jones furthermore expressed an adversarial "us versus the 
cops" relationship.268 Although the Alberta Court of Appeal held 
that Brown's right to silence was not violated, the Supreme Court 
reversed, basing its decision substantially on the dissenting opinion 
258. !d. 'll'll 32, 34. 
259. Id. 'll 33. 
260. [d. 'll 34. Slack testified that during one of her conversations with Jackson, 
he had admitted his involvement in the alleged murder, confiding that he and his co­
accused had planned the murder together and had done it for money. Id. 'll 36. On a 
subsequent visit, Jackson again told Slack that he had killed the victim and disclosed 
that he had buried the clothes he had worn on the night of the murder at a location 
found by the co-accused. Id. 
261. Id. 'll'll 46, 63. 
262. Id. 'll 44. 
263. Id. 
264. R. v. Brown, 127 A.R. 89, 'll 22 (Alta c.A. 1992) (Can.), rev'd, [1993] 2 
S.c.R. 918 (Can. 1993), available at 1992 CarswellAita 667 (Westlaw). 
265. Id. 
266. Id. 'll 99. 
267. Id. 
268. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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provided by Justice Harradence of the Court of Appeal.269 Justice 
Harradence determined that Jones was clearly a state agent who 
developed a relationship of trust with Brown over the course of 
their shared incarceration.27° 
The undercover police officers in Jackson and Brown clearly 
created relationships of trust that they then exploited to elicit in­
criminating statements. They took extensive measures to gain the 
confidence of the accused, even though these relationships did not 
exist prior to arrest. The Supreme Court in R. v. Liew, however, 
established a minimum floor defining a relationship of trust.271 In 
addition to a determination that the exchange with Liew did not 
amount to the functional equivalent of an interrogation, the Court 
also held that no relationship of trust existed between Jones and 
Liew, notwithstanding their common participation in a drug opera­
tion.272 The Court asserted that Liew was "not a case where the 
undercover officer cultivated a sustained relationship with the ac­
cused over time, such that the accused may be said to have spoken 
to the undercover officer in the reasonable expectation that his com­
munications would not wind up in the hands of the police."273 The 
Court posited further that "the facts indicate that the appellant and 
the officer did not know each other prior to the arrests. In such 
circumstances, it is difficult, if not impossible, to suggest that the 
state agent exploited any special characteristics of his relationship 
with the appellant to extract the statement."274 The Court con­
cluded that "to speak of a 'relationship' at all seems to exaggerate 
the circumstances. "275 
Thus, where an undercover police officer has practically no 
contact or prior relationship and has not cultivated a sustained rela­
tionship with the accused over time once contact has been estab­
lished, it seems unlikely that a court will ever find that a s. 7 
violation has taken place. This naturally places an accused in an 
extremely vulnerable position because of the potential for contact 
with an undercover police officer in a cell plant. Furthermore, if 
the undercover police officer is able to procure incriminating state­
269. R. v. Brown, [1993] 2 S.c.R. 918, n 1, 3 (Can. 1993), available at 1993 
CarswellAlta 412 (Westlaw). 
270. Brown, 127 A.R. 89, <j[ 83 (Harradence, J., dissenting). 
271. R. v. Liew, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 227, <j[ 52 (Can. 1999), available at 1999 Carswell 
Alta 821 (Westlaw). 
272. [d. <j[ 55. 
273. [d. <j[ 54 (emphasis added). 
274. [d. <j[ 55. 
275. [d. 
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ments in a short span of time, as did Corporal Jones in Liew, the 
incriminating statements will almost always be admitted. If the 
short relationship between the undercover state agent and the ac­
cused is one where the latter cannot have a reasonable expectation 
that his comments would be communicated to the police, then it 
seems that even if the agent's conduct amounted to the functional 
equivalent of an interrogation, the statements may still be admitted. 
The "reasonable expectation" accretion to the s. 7 jurispru­
dence does not add any value to the right to silence.276 Absent a 
privileged relationship, such as a lawyer-client or marital relation­
ship, what reasonable legal expectation does any individual have 
that his incriminating statements to a third party will not be re­
vealed to the police and used against him, whether they are made in 
detention or outside? The key to a violation of the right to silence 
is that an accused's right to choose to speak with the state is under­
mined by the actions of the state agent, and not whether the ac­
cused had a reasonable expectation that these statements would not 
be revealed to the police. 
The existence of a relationship of trust and whether a state 
agent has manipulated that relationship can certainly have an im­
pact upon whether an elicitation has taken place, but its absence 
should not diminish an accused's constitutional right to silence. De­
tention itself provides a coercive and anxiety-induced environment 
such that an accused may want to unburden herself, notwithstand­
ing the lack of a relationship of trust.277 Because of this, it is critical 
to examine how the nature of the relationship impacts and conte x­
tualizes the nature of the exchange itself and not whether a rela­
tionship of trust exists in isolation. The critical aspect of the right to 
silence is that it offers an accused a choice to speak to authorities. 
That choice should not be predicated upon the existence of a rela­
tionship with someone who may have subverted that choice. 
276. See, e.g., id. 'lI 54. 
277. In State v. Travis, the police placed Langlois, an undercover police officer, 
into the defendant's cell. State v. Travis, 360 A.2d 548, 549 (R.I. 1976). Langlois was 
brought to the cell in handcuffs that were removed once he entered the cell. Id. Lan­
glois testified that he initiated a conversation with the defendant, who then made in­
criminating statements. Id. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Langlois 
violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment Miranda rights as well as his rights under 
the state constitution. Id. at 551. The court stated that: "[t]he mere presence of Lan­
glois was an inducement to speak, and an inducement by a police officer. We see no 
significant difference between a uniformed police officer asking questions of defendant 
and Langlois' presence inside the cellblock with defendant." Id. In this case, there was 
no prior relationship of trust, and the mere presence of another person who initiated 
"casual conversation" was sufficient to elicit incriminating statements. Id. at 550. 
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C. Reframing Elicitation 
Eliciting incriminating statements requires communication. 
More often than not such communication will be achieved verbally, 
through verbal interrogative or declarative statements that call for 
incriminating responses. Verbal communication is understood and 
conveyed through tone, the content of what is stated, and body lan­
guage, in addition to the overall context, including the environment 
and the relationship between the parties. Accordingly, when courts 
design legal tests to determine whether incriminating statements 
have been elicited, they need to factor in these various considera­
tions.278 The United States Supreme Court's deliberate elicitation 
test provides an important starting point by focusing on whether the 
state and its agent took some action that goes beyond mere listen­
ing and is designed to elicit incriminating statements.279 By its 
terms, "some action" should not be limited to the words that the 
agent uses to elicit the statements, but should also include the over­
all conduct of the state and its agent and possibly the use of body 
language and other subtle cues. 
The United States Supreme Court has also stressed the impor­
tance of the detention context and how this may impact an accused. 
Notwithstanding the absence of this consideration in Kuhlmann, its 
acknowledgment by the Henry Court indicates that it is becoming a 
more integral consideration when assessing conduct of the state and 
its agent, not just a principle that is discarded when inconvenient.28o 
Last, in considering elicitation of incriminating information, courts 
should factor into their deliberations any impact that the nature of 
the relationship between the state agent and the accused may have 
on the manner of the exchange and the form it takes. The focus 
should not be on whether a relationship of trust exists, but on rec­
ognizing the effect that any type of relationship, including one that 
is perhaps threatening, may have in producing incriminating 
statements. 
278. White asserts that 
the subtle messages that can be communicated through changes in vocal in­
flection and nonverbal communication pose a formidable factfinding task for 
the Court. ... Nevertheless there is a need to provide more meaningful gui­
dance to the police and lower courts .... [I]t is possible to identify certain 
interrogation tactics that are likely to create an unacceptable risk of depriving 
the suspect of his constitutional rights. 
White, Police Trickery, supra note 26, at 586. 
279. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986). 
280. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 273-74 (1980). 
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An elicitation test that stresses these various factors will pro­
vide a more realistic and contextualized approach to understanding 
human interaction within the cell-plant context. As Justice Bren­
nan asserted in his Kuhlmann dissent, courts need to examine the 
entire scope of government conduct and not merely look to the spe­
cific statements of the agent when eliciting the inculpatory re­
marks.281 Examining the entire scope of government conduct 
should ideally include some form of audio recording that captures 
not only the actual statements of the state agent, but also the tone 
and inflections used, which impact the listener's understanding of 
what is communicated. A more complete examination of the elicit­
ing conduct would, of course, benefit from an actual video record­
ing so that a court could also observe the body language of the 
agent and the accused during the exchange. 
In a cell-plant interrogation, a sound recording device would 
likely be more feasible than video recording equipment and would, 
at a minimum, ensure that the factfinder could ascertain the actual 
words spoken by both parties. Indeed, many jailhouse informants 
have a proven record of fabricating stories and alleged statements 
by an accused.282 Where evidence is introduced by way of jailhouse 
281. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 476 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
282. A variety of convictions have been overturned or impugned due to the ad­
mission of fabricated evidence that was based upon informant testimony. See, e.g., R. v. 
Sophonow, 38 Man. R.2d 198 (Man. c.A. 1986), available at 1986 CarswellMan 498 
(Westlaw), not followed in R. v. Potvin, [1989] 1 S.c.R. 525 (1989 Can.), available at 
1989 Carswell Que 16; R. v. Morin, 37 C.R.4th 395 (Ont. c.A. 1995), available at 1995 
OntCarswell16 (Westlaw). At the conclusion of a commission of inquiry following one 
such overturned conviction in Canada, Justice Fred Kaufman stated: 
The systemic evidence ... emanating from Canada, Great Britain, Austra­
lia and the United States demonstrated to me that these dangers were not 
unique to the in-custody informers presented in the Morin case. Indeed, a 
number of miscarriages of justice throughout the world are likely explained, at 
least in part, by the false, self-serving evidence given by such informers. 
1 FRED KAUFMAN, REPORT OF THE KAUFMAN COMMISSION ON PROCEEDINGS INVOLV­
ING GUY PAUL MORIN 554 (1998), available at http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on. 
ca/english/abouUpubs/morinimorin3h3cd.pdf. In the context of a subsequent and simi­
lar commission of inquiry, presided over by former Supreme Court of Canada Justice 
Peter Cory, his Honor issued a strong admonition against the use of jailhouse infor­
mants. He stated: 
Jailhouse informants comprise the most deceitful and deceptive group of 
witnesses known to frequent the courts. The more notorious the case, the 
greater the number of prospective informants. They rush to testify like vul­
tures to rotting flesh or sharks to blood. They are smooth and convincing liars. 
Whether they seek favours from the authorities, attention or notoriety they 
are in every instance completely unreliable. It will be seen how frequently 
they have been a major factor in the conviction of innocent people and how 
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informants during such interrogations, courts should, short of ban­
ning the use of informant testimony altogether, demand as a consti­
tutional requirement that the state provide audio-recorded 
evidence to support informant testimony.283 
Although there are potentially greater dangers to admitting 
testimony of jailhouse informants absent a taped recording, courts 
should not necessarily be willing to admit testimony of undercover 
police officers about their alleged conversations with a defendant 
absent similar recordings.284 Commentators have stressed the need 
for the recording of formal non-undercover interrogations, and 
nothing less should be expected during surreptitious interroga­
tions.285 Police officers are capable of faulty memory and, worse 
still, distorting statements to serve the perceived needs of the state 
by whom they are employed. While requiring such substantiation 
through audio recording devices in earlier eras of police investiga­
tion may have been impractical, modern technology permits such 
possibilities. 
It is time that the courts require the police to employ such re­
cording methods during cell-plant interrogations because trans-
much they tend to corrupt the administration of justice. Usually, their pres­
ence as witnesses signals the end of any hope of providing a fair trial. 
They must be recognized as a very great danger to our trial system. Steps 
must be taken to rid the courts of this cancerous corruption of the administra­
tion of justice. Perhaps, the greatest danger flows from their ability to testify 
falsely in a remarkably convincing manner. In this case, it will be seen that an 
experienced detective thought that Mr. Martin, a very frequent jailhouse in­
formant with a conviction for perjury, was a credible witness. He lied in this 
case and he has testified in at least nine other cases, undoubtedly with the 
same degree of mendacity. Jailhouse informants are a festering sore. They 
constitute a malignant infection that renders a fair trial impossible. They 
should, as far as it is possible, be excised and removed from our trial process. 
Jailhouse informants are a uniquely evil group. Justice Kaufman in the 
Morin Inquiry dealt extensively with jailhouse informants and the harm that 
they occasion. His thoughtful and helpful recommendations are carefully set 
out in his report. I will adopt them but go still further in my recommendations 
on this subject. 
MANITOBA JUSTICE, THE INQUIRY REGARDING THOMAS SOPHONOW (2001), http:// 
www.gov.mb.ca/justice/publications/sophonow/appendixlappendixf.pdf. 
283. In Kuhlmann it was unclear what exactly was said when Wilson and Lee 
spoke to each other and what Lee may have said to induce Wilson to make his incrimi­
nating admissions. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 439. In Broyles II, the informant's testimony 
told a much different story than what the detective recounted in his testimony. R. v. 
Broyles (Broyles II), 312 A.R. 31, <JI<JI 6-7 (Alta c.A. 1999) (Can.), available at 1999 
CarswellAlta 341 (Westlaw). 
284. This is not to suggest that where the state agent is an undercover police 
officer, the court should allow the admission absent recorded verification. 
285. See Leo et aI., supra note 35, at 522. 
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parency of government operations is essential for preserving a fair 
trial and promoting respect for the integrity of the judicial system. 
Such minimum requirements further reflect the importance of the 
constitutional rights that are implicated, for if questioning takes 
place in the absence of counsel, it should be incumbent on courts to 
ensure that the manner in which the statements were elicited does 
not fall short of standards required by principles of adjudicative 
fairness. Such considerations are consonant with a purposive ap­
proach to the rights to silence and counsel in Canada and the 
United States respectively. 
Although the United States version of the elicitation test is 
preferable to the Canadian version, even under the United States 
approach "mere listening" should really mean mere listening or its 
functional equivalent. The Kuhlmann Court strayed from a strict 
interpretation of "mere listening" when it found Kuhlmann's state­
ments-spoken during his conversations with Lee-admissible.286 
It is conceivable that that there is a functional equivalent to mere 
listening; there is the possibility that a state agent may make some 
statements that have no reasonable connection to the crime that the 
accused has committed and would not reasonably call for an incrim­
inating response, yet nevertheless result in the accused making such 
statements. 
The factual context of Broyles II helps to illustrate the concept 
of mere listening or its functional equivalent.287 Assume that 
Broyles disclosed his incriminating statements to the state agent fol­
lowing Broyles's conversation with his mother and his pastor in ex­
actly the same manner that was described in the decision.288 
However, instead of Broyles first meeting the agent two weeks 
prior, they met the very same day that Broyles disclosed the incrim­
inating statements. Assume that following this first meeting, 
Broyles sensed that the state agent, as compared to other inmates, 
was a sympathetic individual and thus felt comfortable approaching 
the agent following his conversation with his mother and pastor. 
Would the agent's questions, in the absence of a relationship of 
trust, still rise to the level of action that went beyond mere listening 
or its functional equivalent? Indeed, even in the absence of such a 
relationship, the question "what do you mean?" was likely to elicit 
286. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 439; see also supra notes 181-196 and accompanying 
text. 
287. For a discussion of the facts of Broyles II, 312 A.R. 31, see supra notes 216­
224 and accompanying text. 
288. See Broyles II, 312 A.R. 31, <J[ 16. 
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incriminating statements. Broyles was clearly distraught and his 
first statement in response to the question alluded to his crime. 
Therefore, the state agent's question was bound to draw a more 
elaborate response and could not be construed as mere listening. 
This is particularly true given that the pressures of confinement can 
influence some individuals to allay their anxiety by speaking to fel­
low inmates, regardless whether they have a prior relationship of 
trust,289 A question delivered by a state agent pretending to be a 
fellow inmate that reasonably leads to an inmate uttering incrimi­
nating statements is action that goes beyond mere listening. 
By contrast, imagine the following variation of the hypotheti­
cal. Instead of Broyles seeking out the state agent following the 
conversation with his mother and pastor, he sits alone in a corner 
quietly. The state agent has no particular knowledge of Broyles's 
mother's visit and approaches Broyles asking him about his day. 
Broyles then says "I've seen better days." The state agent re­
sponds, "I know what that's like, but things get better, don't 
worry." Broyles then responds: "Can't help but worry, I'm going to 
burn in hell for killing my girlfriend." The state agent responds, 
"Whoa. Listen, don't go repeating that to the wrong people, it 
could land you in trouble." Broyles, realizing what he just said, 
changes the topic quickly. In this scenario, the state agent's state­
ments prior to Broyles's inculpatory remarks would be the func­
tional equivalent of "mere listening" because his comments would 
not reasonably lead to an incriminating response. The normative 
argument in support of this reading is that while custodial environ­
ments do impose a certain degree of pressure, defendants can make 
voluntary statements that are completely unsolicited. 
CONCLUSION: REINVIGORATING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
This Article has explored the constitutional approaches to cell­
plant interrogations in Canada and the United States. While it is 
clear that constitutional protections exist in both countries, these 
protections are far from perfect with respect to providing adequate 
safeguards to the accused. The Sixth Amendment, as interpreted 
by the United States Supreme Court, only comes into effect once 
formal proceedings have commenced against an accused with re­
spect to a particular offense, leaving an individual in the United 
States without any effective prophylaxis against cell-plant interro­
gations prior to this period. Furthermore, in order for the Sixth 
289. See, e.g., State v. Travis, 360 A.2d 548, 551 (R.I. 1976). 
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Amendment to have any effect on suppressing statements acquired 
during a cell-plant interrogation, the accused must show that a con­
tractual relationship existed between the putative state agent and 
the authorities. In various state and federal jurisdictions, the con­
tractual requirement seems to require a more express agreement, 
whereas in others the agreement may be implied. 
The Canadian Charter's s. 7 right to silence provision protects 
an accused upon arrest or detention, but is spatially confined to a 
detention setting. While more flexible on determining state agency, 
the Supreme Court of Canada's interpretation of elicitation under s. 
7 requires the accused to show a significant relationship of trust be­
tween the accused and the state agent, one that makes an accused 
more vulnerable if the incriminating statements are made soon af­
ter being placed in detention to a person he may have spoken to for 
a few hours or less. 
The rights to counsel and silence in the United States and Ca­
nada respectively require significant strengthening. One of the pri­
mary purposes of these rights is to provide a considerable degree of 
fundamental fairness to individuals subjected to criminal investiga­
tion by the superior power of law enforcement officials. When the 
Supreme Courts of Canada and the United States extended consti­
tutional protections to individuals subjected to cell-plant interroga­
tions, they recognized that to do otherwise would allow police 
officers to do surreptitiously what they could not do directly.290 
Yet, by establishing such significant hurdles for accuseds to prove 
violations of their constitutional rights, the Courts in both countries 
have effectively undermined these rights.291 In so doing, these 
rights almost become a facade. One way in which to reestablish a 
considerable degree of fairness for Canadian and United States sus­
pects in these contexts would be to combine the most progressive 
290. See, e.g., R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.c.R. 151, 'll 123 (Can. 1990), available at 
1990 CarswellYukon 7 (Westlaw). 
291. Courts need to recognize the realities of prison life and the pressures and 
anxieties inherent within. One study recounts the revelations of Sol Wachtler, a former 
Chief Judge for the New York Court of Appeals, who, after being incarcerated, noted 
the skewed picture that judges are presented of life in detention. He wrote: "'I always 
knew that 1 was seeing only what 1 was supposed to see [as a judge], but 1 felt my visit 
was a demonstration to the inmates that we cared about their conditions.''' See MOR­
RIS, supra note 21, at 180 (citing Colman McCarthy, A Judge's Report from Behind 
Bars, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1995, at A17). Wachtler further reflected however that 
'''[n]ow that I am prisoner and judges are being shown the facility that imprisons me, 1 
realize how deluded 1 was in those years by my own vanity and by those escorts who so 
carefully planned my itinerary.'" Id. 
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and protective attributes of the applicable Canadian and American 
law. 
The legal tests and factors used to determine the existence of 
state agency and elicitation should be reformulated in both coun­
tries. For instance, with respect to evaluating the establishment of 
state agency, courts in Canada and the United States should look to 
whether law enforcement officials intervened in some manner that 
had a tangible impact on the exchange between the accused and the 
putative agent. In determining what constitutes an agency relation­
ship between the state and a jailhouse informant, courts should 
look to both overt and subtle forms of communication that the state 
may use to signal to an informant that it is interested in receiving 
information about other individuals within the jailhouse or prison 
environment, regardless whether such individuals are specifically 
identified or not. The focus should be on the intervention of the 
state in stimulating an exchange between an agent and an accused. 
Courts should not deny the existence of an agency relationship 
merely because the agent is not promised or provided 
remuneration. 
The Supreme Court of Canada and the United States Supreme 
Court should adopt a broader test for determining elicitation that 
expands on the latter's deliberate elicitation test enunciated in 
Kuhlmann.292 Under a broadened test, defendants in Canada and 
the United States who seek to quash any incriminating statements 
procured through a cell-plant interrogation should have to satisfy 
the following test: taking into account the pressures of confinement 
and its impact upon the accused, did the police or its agents take 
some action beyond mere listening or its functional equivalen~, that 
was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks from the 
accused? Furthermore, unlike the Kuhlmann Court's application of 
that test, "mere listening" should actually mean "mere listening" or 
its functional equivalent. This is particularly true where discussion 
is initiated about the crime or crimes for which the accused is 
charged or could reasonably lead to the utterance of incriminating 
statements about the crimes charged. In addition, when the elicita­
tion takes place in the detention context, courts must take into ac­
count how the contextual impact of confinement may have 
heightened the impact of the agent's actions leading to the utter­
ance of the incriminating statements. 
292. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986). 
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Courts should examine the full course of conduct by the state 
and its agents when assessing whether a suspect's statements were 
elicited. For example, where the agent has developed a relationship 
with the accused, the extent to which such an agent may have to 
take "some action" beyond mere listening may be significantly less 
than an agent who is able to elicit incriminating statements from an 
accused she has just met. However, the absence of such a relation­
ship should not lead to the conclusion that a state agent in such 
circumstances must then ask questions that are akin to a formal in­
terrogation or its functional equivalent. As long as the agent com­
mits to some action beyond mere listening or its functional 
equivalent, such conduct should be sufficient to demonstrate 
elicitation. 
Lastly, in order to properly assess the record in a more com­
prehensive manner, including the actions of the state agent, the en­
tire course of the communications between the agent and the 
accused should be recorded. Courts will then not have to rely 
solely upon the potential fabrications of the accused or a jailhouse 
informant or the genuinely faulty memory of any state agent in re­
counting the details of the exchange. 
Emphasizing such flexible factors will be consistent with a pur­
posive interpretation of the s. 7 right to silence and the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, one that draws upon "the principles 
of adjudicative fairness" and "concern for fair treatment of an ac­
cused person."293 It will provide more meaningful substance to 
these fundamental constitutional rights that exist to limit the over­
whelming and overreaching power of the state against individuals. 
This power imbalance is heightened against suspects who are de­
tained by the state and subject to intense anxieties inherent to 
custody.294 
United States and Canadian courts are the vanguards of consti­
tutional protections. To allow the state to circumvent such funda­
mental rights by exploiting a detainee's vulnerability in such a 
deceptive manner cannot be in accordance with the purpose of the 
Canadian Charter or the United States Constitution. Courts must 
restore balance to this disequilibrium lest these core protections be 
so easily circumvented by unfair state tactics that they are rendered 
practically obsolete. 
293. R. v. Brydges, [1990] 1 S.c.R. 190, 'II 13 (Can. 1990), available at 1990 
CarswellAlta 3 (Westlaw) (citing R. v. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.c.R. 383 (Can. 1986), availa­
ble at 1986 CarswellNB 14 (Westlaw)). 
294. See discussion supra Part I. 
